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Cyprus represents one of the most enduring and problematic regional conflicts. 
Since Cyprus' independence in 1960, the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots have been in 
conflict, culminating in the arrival of the UN Peace-keeping Force (UNFICYP) in 1964 
and the 1974 Turkish invasion. The regional concerns of Greece and Turkey and their 
proclivity to protect and advance the interests of their related ethnic communities on the 
island have played serious roles in the maintenance of the conflict. The thesis illustrates 
the weakness of the international mediation effort and the obstacles to a settlement. 
Although third parties, such as the UN, the USA and the EU, are pressing the issue, a 
solution ultimately depends on the four key actors, the two Cypriot communities and 
Greece and Turkey, coming to a mutually acceptable agreement. More recently, the EU 
has become involved in the issue because of the intended accession negotiations for 
Cyprus, and its special relations with Greece - as an EU member- and Turkey, as an EU-
membership candidate following the 1999 EU summit in Helsinki. Both the EU and USA 
calculate that a political federal solution of Cyprus' problem will benefit both Cypriot 
communities, improve Greek-Turkish relations, and formalize Turkey's European status. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean. Its history goes back nine 
thousand years. The Cyprus regional conflict represents a category of protracted social 
conflicts, which defy resolution and constantly endanger international peace and security. 
This thesis will examine the background of the Cyprus regional conflict. The geopolitical 
nature of Cyprus, subject to so many conflicting interests, from the communal to regional 
and the international level that makes the conflict so apparently intractable . Besides the 
co-existence of the two communities there were two different self-contained ethnic 
groups divided along linguistic, religious, and cultural lines. The political division and 
attachment of the two groups to their motherlands reinforced the ethnic cleavage. At the 
same level, it is critical to remember the different political roles of Greece and Turkey in 
the repeated crises in the decades of 60s and 70s. In the end, the interests also of Britain 
and USA as partly represented through NATO, have added a final layer of global security 
considerations and worries to an already complicated situation. 
In this thesis I will explore the conditions under which a negotiated peace 
settlement failed to guide the disputing parties in an effective process of peace building. 
The focus of this thesis will be on peace settlements where a third party, notably the UN, 
have been actively involved not only in peacekeeping but also in post-conflict peace 
building. The UN peacekeeping operation in Cyprus has been one of the longest of its 
kind, and has been aimed at aiding the two community parties to escape their security 
XIV 
dilemmas. A new factor, the probable acceptance of official Cyprus state in the EU gives 
new dynamic to the problem of the island. While accession negotiations are under way, 
and Cyprus prepares to become a full member of the EU, efforts to reach a political 
settlement on the island are intensifying. The UN, the EU and the USA are all making 
concerted efforts through the method of the international mediation to break the impasse. 
The framework will address the description and prescription of: (1) the role of 
third party interveners in the period following 1974 Turkish invasion; (2) behaviors and 
interests of the disputing parties; (3) the structural characteristics of the conflict process; 
(4) the changing dynamics of regional and international power relationships; (5) the 
investigation of the conflict environment; and (6) the selection of an ideal procedure of 
conflict resolution according to the special conditions and characteristics of the island. 
The thesis will investigate contemporary theories of solving regional ethnic conflicts and 
the various conflict resolution options available, and in the end, the investigation of the 
impediments for the settlement of the problem. 
The study will be organized in six chapters. In the first chapter, the background 
of the conflict, a, brief history of the conflict (historical approach) with the reference of 
the serious effects of the 1974 Turkish invasion. It will provide for a short historical 
narrative of Cyprus regional conflict. In the second chapter, a theoretical framework will 
be developed for a deep analysis of the conflict, and for the research of conflict resolution 
methods. This will be the result of the study of the following issues: a review of the 
literature on mediation as an instrument of conflict resolution, on the proper mediation 
process, the anticipation of the ethnic conflict by the international community in the 
XV 
present time, and on the role of UN as a mediator. In the third chapter, the thesis will 
focus on Greek and Turkish involvement, the causes, process and consequences of 
American, British and Soviet involvement, as well as on the interests of the parties in this 
regional conflict. The forth chapter will be a development of the 197 4 mediation efforts. 
The fifth chapter will be an analysis of the conflict, a justification of the weakness of 
international mediation and the reasons-obstacles to a settlement of the problem. It will 
provide also with the necessary requirements of a future serious attempt by a third party 
mediator with richly resources and primary with strong desire or interest to contribute to 
the final settlement of the Cyprus problem. In the end, it will be a development of a 
process with flexibility that satisfies the interests of the disputant parties and assure for 
the island a viable with duration solution. It will be after a strategic assessment of the 
existing situation on the island, a few only months after the entrance of the new century. 
Finally, the analysis of the conflict will share both an optimistic and pessimistic 
vtew of the problem, two different situations, about the settlement or the future 
perpetuation of the problem. According to these options the critical variable, Turkish 
party and his foreign policy for the next years, will influence greatly the issue. With the 
European orientation of this country, especially after its official acceptance as a candidate 
member of the European Union, Turkey is obliged to follow the directive of the EU about 
a positive contribution to a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. Its post- Cold war 
expansion into southeastern Europe could bring not only economic benefit but also a 
radically new and constructive political framework with the eventual entry of Cyprus and 
Turkey into the Union. It is a deep desire of this thesis, even with the indication of the 
xvi 
problems or difficulties for this option, to accept this process. In any occasion, it will 
present the benefits of this settlement 
xvn 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT. THE RESULTS OF 
1974 TURKISH INVASION 
The Cyprus regional conflict can be divided into three phases. Until 1960, it was a 
colonial issue that was settled with the granting of independence and the establishment of 
the Republic of Cyprus. From 1960 until 1974, the problem was basically an internal 
dispute between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in which external powers were involved. 
The third phase covers the period from 1974, the dominant element ofthe problem being 
the de facto division of the island and the continuing military occupation ofNorth Cyprus 
by Turkey. By the summer of 1996, there had already been several indications that the 
petrified stalemate in Cyprus was breaking up. Internal and external developments 
combined to re-open what many had come to regard as a closed issue. Once again, it 
became clear that enforced partition does not consist a solution ofthe Cyprus problem. 1 
The prevalence of liberal ideas in Europe and the rise of nationalism in the 19th 
century, were transmitted in Cyprus into a call for freedom, self-determination and unity 
with the Greek state. The complication of the Cyprus problem was a result of changing 
circumstances, international developments and foreign interventions. The transfer of 
power in 1878 from the Ottoman regime to British rule allowed the national movement in 
Cyprus to grow, culminating in the 1931 uprising and the 1955-59-liberation movement. 
I Hitchens C., Hostage to History: Cyprus, from the Ottomans to Kissinger, pp 9-15,Verso 
London-NewYork, 1998. 
1 
After more than 300 years of Ottoman rule, the island came under British administration 
in 1878, though Turkey formally transferred sovereignty to Britain in 1923. British 
colonial administration continued on the island until 1960 when a joint hi-communal 
state, the Republic of Cyprus was founded on the basis of international treaties, signed by 
Britain, Turkey, Greece, and representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities. The state of affairs created by the 1960 agreements set up a political 
partnership between the two national communities, which would enable them to share 
power and work together within a hi-communal state. 
In 1960, Cyprus was declared an independent Republic on the basis of so-called 
Zurich-London agreements. However, the Constitution that was imposed contained 
divisive provisions, which encouraged confrontation and dissent between the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots (80 percent and 18 percent of the population respectively). In addition, 
the rights granted to Britain, Greece and Turkey , as guarantor states, embroiled the young 
state in the antagonisms among the great powers and in the clashes between various 
economic and strategic interests in the region. The inflexible constitution of 1960 not 
only denied the 80% of the population who were Greek Cypriots their legitimate right for 
self-determination in the shape of that long-desired union with the Greece, but in practice 
even denied the great majority of population the possibility of effective self- government 
and internal democracy. The result was a continual political discontent between the two 
ethnic communities. The sentiments of Greek Cypriots were fuelled by the Turkish 
Cypriot political leadership's obstruction between 1960 and 1963. The two communities 
2 
were soon locked into a constitutional crisis, which became even more serious when 
Turkey rejected proposals by President Makarios for an amendment of the 1960 
constitution. From December 1963 until 1968 intercommunal violence caused grave 
suffering to both communities as a product of mutual suspicion and fear stirred by 
Turkey's policy of dividing the two communities. The United Nations in an effort to 
mediate the problem finally sent a peacekeeping force in 1964. Turkey, with a view to 
promoting her expansionist and partitionist plans; found ways and means to mobilize 
Turkish Cypriot extremists to prevent the smooth functioning of the state, which led to 
the intercommunal clashes of 1963/64 and 1967.2 
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots instantly rejected the UN mediator's report (Galo 
Plaza, former President of Ecuador) on 26 March 1965 about the problem. It considered 
the 1960 solution as a constitutional impasse, which could not be maintained against the 
will of the majority. At the same period, Turkey threatened to invade Cyprus. She was 
only restrained from so doing by UN Security council involvement, and mostly by 
President Johnson's direct and harsh intervention in 1965 and again in 1967. Indeed, 
during this period in order to pre-empt a Turkish invasion a Greek regular army of 12000 
men (one Greek Army Division) was moved to Cyprus. But with a renewed threat of a 
Turkish invasion, this force after international diplomatic activity securing a Greek-
Turkish peace settlement was withdrawn at the end of 1967. The political leaderships of 
two communities were persuaded to begin the interminable process of inter-communal 
negotiation for a just settlement of the Cyprus question but without any serious result. 
2 Hitchens, C., pp. 29-60. 
3 
The two communities with fears and aspirations blocked any agreement, which would 
deny Turkey partition of the island or which would ensure the preservation of an 
independent non-aligned Cyprus state.3 
The study of the historical facts of this period introduces some useful 
assumptions. The lack of ethnic and political ties prevented the development of a 
common Cypriot political culture and the creation of a strong and independent state. With 
the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the ethnic and political divisions and 
differences of the past were fully developed into the State function and the political 
process. Ethnicity was brought into the political environment and the political game was 
transformed into an ethno political struggle between the two Cypriots communities. The 
ethnicity obtained a strong politicization, which was facilitated by the fragmented 
political framework of the state and the 1960 constitution. The psychological distance and 
the demand for political autonomy of the two ethnic groups were the next consequences. 
This greatly facilitated by the different and conflicting national, religious, ethnic, and 
cultural values and practices of the two communities. Thus, the two ethnic groups 
transformed into two separate political conflict groups.4 The two groups were tempted to 
use the state institutions and political process at the expense of the other and for the 
satisfaction of group interests. The Turkish Cypriot minority made extensive use of its 
3 Kyle, K., Cyprus, in Search of Peace pp.9-l6, MRG Press, 1984. 
4 There is an argument about the role of culture in ethnic conflict. Future research should nest 
cultural variables within capacity-based and decision making models of ethnic conflicts. Generally the 
cultural variables should be recognized as important correlates of war. Henderson, A.E., "Culture or 
Contiguity," Journal of Conflict Resolution, V.41, No 5, pp.648-667, October 1997. 
4 
legal and political safeguards and avoided negotiations.s Instead, it used intransigence 
attitude as a measure of defense and sought political autonomy and secession. In this 
occasion the communal elites usually fail to co-operate in counteracting the effects of 
ethnic and political fragmentation. 
The repeated crises in the 1960s and 1970s showed that Cyprus, at that time, was 
logistically beyond the range of Greece's defense capability. Therefore, it can be drawn 
that ethnic constraints and considerations- especially the strong ethnic ties with the Greek 
Cypriots and the age old ethnic rivalry with Turkey- have determined the attitude, policy 
and role of Greece on Cyprus. From the other side's point of view Turkey's role on 
Cyprus had and have to do with strategic considerations. Ethnic considerations, the 
presence of Turkish minority to the island, and strategic factors have been congruent and 
mutually reinforcing in causing a permanent Turkish involvement in Cyprus, which 
eventually led to the invasion in 1974. Co-operation between the two motherlands and 
their respective Cypriot communities has bee:t;1 close and constant, except during the 
period of military rule in Greece when Athens - Nicosia improved political 
contradictions.6 This co-operation took the form of tight alliances in the political, 
5 The Parliament had 35 Greek Cypriots and 15 Turkish Cypriots deputies. Eight (8) Turkish 
Cypriots members could defeat a bill voted by the other members (separate majorities). The problem is one 
of simple mathematics. In 1960 Greeks Cypriots made up 80% of the population, and the Turks 18,4%. A 
minority of 18% was given 30% of the House of Representatives and all governmental, administrative and 
state posts. 
6 The deteriorating relations between President Makarios and the junta in Athens coupled with the 
development of a terrorist opposition to the President of Cyprus on Cyprus. Moreover, as Richard 
Holbrooke, the Ambassador of the USA in the United Nations, declared on 11 November 1997 during a 
mediation's effort:" American history in this area is not entirely clean. There are some things that precious 
American Administrations did ... particularly between the mid 1960s and 1977 which I think were 
shameful." He was referring specifically to the USA's support for the Greek junta, who were able to derive 
from this the impression that it was with US approval that they could move against Makarios. Kyle, p.16. 
5 
diplomatic, and military fields. The two countries were involved in military operations on 
Cyprus while playing a major role in international diplomacy dealing with the ethnic 
conflict.7 
On 15 July 197 4, a coup d'etat against President of Cyprus, Makarios took place, 
backed and organized by the ruling military junta in Greece. On July 20 1974, Turkey, 
alleging the right of unilateral even military intervention following the provisions of the 
Zurich-London agreement guarantor of the 1960 Constitution, and due to the reluctance 
of Britain as guarantor nation to actively engage in the conflict, invaded in Cyprus. As its 
excuse to invade, it used that it was undertaking a "peace operation," which aimed to the 
elimination of the danger directed against the very existence of the Republic of Cyprus, 
and the restoration of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the island. 
When the UN Security Council intervened, negotiations on the situation began in Geneva 
among Turkey, Greece, Cyprus and the UK, Turkey tried to impose its views and also 
gain time for a second military operation. Thus, Turkey instead of restoring the state of 
affairs and protecting the human rights of all the people of Cyprus, as was her duty and 
alleged justification, massively extended her invasion to occupy 36,4% of Cyprus, driving 
out well over 170.000 Greek Cypriot refugees and moving her army to the named "Attila 
line." The occupied area is the richest of the island, representing 70% of its resources. 
This operation took place on 13-14 August 1974, while the talks in Geneva were still 
going on. This action obviously had not any legal justification according to the right of 
7 Markides, C.The Rise and Fall of Cyprus Republic, pp.l-35, Yale University Press, 1977,and 
Kaloudis, G., "Cyprus: The Enduring Conflict," International Journal of World Peace, V. 16, No 1,pp.3-12, 
January 1999. 
6 
this country from the Zurich-London agreements. Besides this, on 14 August 1974, the 
coup collapsed and a democratic government was restored in Greece. The political 
environment was absolutely different from that of the first invasion. Since then, the 
northern territory has metamorphosed from a provisional administration to an 
autonomous administration, and finally in 1983 to the "Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus" which is still internationally unrecognized other than by Turkey. The Security 
Council in its resolution 541 of 1983 condemned this pseudostate. 8 
With 37 percent of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, 70 percent of the 
natural resources were concentrated under Turkish administration. One third of the 
population, about 200,000 Greek Cypriots, has been displaced from the occupied northern 
sector where they constituted 80% of the inhabitants. At the same time, the Turkish 
Cypriots who lived in the southern areas of Cyprus were forced by their leaders to move 
to the northern areas. The ascertainment of the fate of the missing persons is still pending. 
Only 481 people out of the original 20,000 at the end of 1974 remain in their occupied 
villages living under conditions of oppression, harassment and deprivation. The Turkish 
occupation army about 35,000 soldiers, armed with the latest weapons and supported by 
land and sea forces, are stationed in the occupied area, making it, according to the UN 
Secretary-General, one of the most militarized regions of the world.9 Turkey also has 
been brought about 85,000 Turks to colonize the occupied area with the aim of changing 
8Joseph, S.J., Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics, pp. 17-33, StMartin's Press, 
1997. 
9 "Protecting" the so-called TRNC two infantry divisions, 300 main battle tanks, eight aircraft and 
12 helicopters. Wyllie, J., "Turkey-Adapting to New Strategic Realities," Jane's Intelligence Review," V. 4, 
No 10, p.450, October 1992. 
7 
the demography of the island and controlling the political situation. The hermetically 
sealed "Attila line" ("Operation Attila" was the code-name Turkey gave to the invasion of 
Cyprus) artificially divides the island and its people and prevents Cypriots from moving 
freely throughout their country. According to Turkish-Cypriot sources, about 50,000 
Turkish Cypriots emigrated from the occupied area between 1974-1995 because of the 
economic, social and moral deprivation, which prevails there. As a result the Turkish 
Cypriots who are left are today outnumbered by the Turkish troops together with the 
colonists.IOThe illegal regime in the occupied area is deliberately trying to eradicate every 
trace of a 9,000-year-old cultural and historical heritage. Turkish ones have replaced all 
Greek toponymes. Churches, monuments, cemeteries and archaeological sites have been 
destroyed, desecrated or looted. Priceless religious and archaeological treasures, part of 
the world's cultural heritage, are stolen and smuggled abroad, and illegal excavations and 
dealings in antiquities are taking place. II 
Another terrible effect from the Greek ~d Turkish involvement in Cyprus was 
the widening of the conflict across the Aegean, which had a devastating influence on the 
10 Kyle, pp.17-21. 
11 A comment by Hitchens emphasizes the results of 1974 Turkish invasion: "Many Turks feel 
the EU is, so speak, culturally and historically biased against them. The memories of Lepanto and the gates 
of Vienna, the catchphrase 'Terrible Turk' to describe obnoxious children in nursery rhymes, all these and 
more have created an impression of something fearful and brutish lurking in Anatolia. There is also the 
strangeness of Islam to most Europeans, and the vivid, terrifying accounts of what happened to Christian 
Bulgaria and Armenia under Turkish rule. Greeks, in particular, have a national memory of Ottoman 
subjugation and it is not difficult to find strong views among them about the shortcomings of Turks as a 
people. All of this is deplorable. But there is no need to draw upon ancient prejudice in examining what the 
Turkish army did in August 1974. The record is a clear one, compiled for the most part by neutral outside 
jurists, and it shows that Turkey employed deliberate means of terror and indiscriminate cruelty. It did not 
do because of something in its nature or because of the inheritance of some presumed streak of barbarism. It 
did so for the very modem and cold-blooded reason that it wanted territory without inhabitants. Hitchens, 
C., p. 102. 
8 
bilateral relations of the two countries, though allies in NATO. The revival of old rivalry 
and animosity severely damaged Greek-Turkish relations in the economic, diplomatic, 
cultural and social areas. Deterioration in bilateral relations and intermingling of 
ethnicized domestic and external politics had, in tum, a serious effect on Cyprus. The 
ethnic tension and passion of the three countries hindered the practice of diplomacy and 
created conditions conductive for the use of force. This rivalry also reflected in the 
impediment of international diplomacy and mediation. The parties involved very often 
rejected or undermined initiatives undertaken by third parties for a peaceful settlement of 
the conflict through a continual bargaining of different sides. So the diplomacy through 
the way of international mediation did not run its full course. The Turkish side continues 
unpunished and indifferent to the calls of the international community, as expressed in 
dozens of UN resolutions, to maintain the occupation and the artificial division of the 
island. Thus, it has not shown until now that an absolute political will to really solve the 
problem. The official Cyprus government is firmly committed to finding a viable solution 
through negotiation based on the UN resolutions. This solution would safeguard the 
independence, spvereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, ensure the 
withdrawal of Turkish troops and colonists, secure the human rights and basic freedoms 
of all Cypriots, safeguard the future of the Cypriot people as a whole in conditions of 
peace, prosperity and progress, in a united, federal and probably demilitarized state within 
the European Union. 
9 
B. SECURITY PROBLEMS AND RECENT EVENTS 
Events in Cyprus over the last couple of years have sharply reminded the 
international community of the interdependence of the island's problems and the wider 
Greco-Turkish conflict. The relatively low number of killings in Cyprus since 197 4, due 
largely to the presence of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the 
impermeability of the UN-controlled buffer zone, has given world public opinion the 
impression that Cyprus is an outrunning conflict, characterized by the perpetual search or 
a compromise solution - one that must accommodate the diverse range of strategic 
wishes generated at the local, regional and international levels. 
In October 1993, Greece declared Cyprus - after almost 20 years of stagnation of 
the problem- as an integral part of Greece's sphere of defense, and the two governments 
worked together to conclude a defense agreement with the title "Greek- Greek Cypriot 
joint defense doctrine." Since then a growing involvement of Greek and Turkish military 
personnel and hardware in Cyprus' military affairs has been apparent. Greek warplanes 
participated in the exercise of the Cypriot National Guard in "Nikiforos 97" and, for the 
first time ever, Turkish military aircraft were reported to have tangled with Greek military 
aircraft within Nicosia's FIR. During the annual military exercise in the north of Cyprus-
"Toros 97" (involving the Turkish armed forces and the Turkish security forces)- Turkish 
military aircraft attacked mock strategic targets and Turkish Special Forces made airborne 
and amphibious landings on Cyprus for first time since 1974.12 
12 Bruce, J., "Heightened Tensions Over Cyprus," Jane's Intelligence Review," V.8, No. 7, .306-
308, July 1996. 
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By summer 1996, there had been serious indications that the petrified impasse in 
Cyprus issue was interrupting. There were three main changes: First, the European 
perspective. The application of the Republic of Cyprus for full accession to the EU had 
the effect of reviewing the whole Cyprus issue on the international agenda. Second, the 
end ofthe Cold War, and the events in former Yugoslavia, had the effect of deepening the 
contradictions between Greece and Turkey. The two countries were less tied with the 
alliance discipline and with opponent political stances against issues like Bosnian war, 
Albania or FYROM. The old dispute over Aegean Sea control was rejuvenated by a 
Turkish challenge to Greek sovereignty against the Imia islets. War was escaped only in 
the last minute, and a new arms race began, which is going until the present days. And 
third, the internal status quo met a watershed with the worst period of intercommunal 
killings for 22 years concentrated in the increasingly and dangerously under-resourced 
buffer zone.B 
A Berlin motorcycle rally, in August 1996 of this year, was an innocuous starting 
point for what became a violent chain of events. Protesting over the impermeability of 
Cyprus' border relative to those of Europe, the motorcyclists' final section of their 
transnational ride was to concentrate on the UN buffer zone in southern Nicosia. Despite 
the effort of the Greek Cypriot Government to call off the event, protestors proceeded to 
make incursions. Over 40 Greek Cypriots demonstrators and 19 UNFICYP soldiers were 
wounded in clashes, and at Dherinia Turkish Cypriot police and counter-protestors beat a 
Greek Cypriot to death. Three days later, another Greek Cypriot was fatally shot while 
13 Kyle p.30, and Streissguth, T., Divided Island, pp.84-90, Cemer Press, 1998. 
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trying to lower a Turkish flag in the buffer zone. The killing of four Greek Cypriots in the 
buffer zone during this year not only refocused attention on the role of Turkish troops on 
the island, but also brought into question the Greek Cypriots' patience for a peace 
solution. Following these events, the UN, the UK and the USA reintroduced a proposal 
for the smoothening of the explosive situation.I4 
Arms imports had constituted a destabilizing factor in Cyprus' intercommunal 
clashes even before 197 4, but they appear to have been overshadowed by a more recent 
surge in activity. The decision also by the Greek Cypriot Government in January 1997 to 
buy Russian S-300 P surface-to-air missile system for the defense of the island raised new 
stakes with Turkey and ultimately exposed the fragility of the de facto peace. IS Arguably 
following US pressure, the official Cyprus government initially made assurances that no 
part of S-300 systems would be deployed for another 16 months. The continual 
postponements of the matter had a final ending, the transfer of these systems to Greece 
and deployment on Crete in September 1999. Greek Cypriot side also supported that 
these developments were connected with his proposal about the demilitarization of the 
island, a fact th~t had met a continued rejection by the Turkish Cypriot side. Although the 
S-300 purchase has clear implications for the Turkish Air Force, the Greek Cypriots 
would still expect a 48-hour wait for Greek troops to reach the island - in contrast to a 
14 Special Report No 17, "Instability in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Cypriot Crisis in the 
Making, Jane's Intelligence Review, pp 10-16, 1998. 
15 In the last few years Nicosia has become one of the highest defense spenders in the Middle 
East, trailing only Kuwait and Israel on a per capita basis. Bruce, J., pp.306-308 and Dorsey, M. J., " 
Mounting Communal Tensions Increase Need for Cyprus Settlement," Washington Report On Middle East 
Affairs, V.15, No.7, p.29&91, March 1997. 
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theoretical six-minute flight time from the Turkish mainland. Sea transport remains a 
feasible alternative, with the Turkish mainland only 40 miles away and open ports 
available at Kyrenia and Ammohostos. At the same time the Turkish Army keeps a six-
to-one superiority in tanks stationed on the island. This system is mainly defensive but 
Turkey claims that the S-300s can be converted to surface-to-surface weapons and 
proclaims an intention to hit them. Its concern over such a deployment has been visible 
ever since, demonstrated by the largest capabilities ever obtained by the Greek Cypriot 
side. Clearly the missile purchase gave a new strengthening to the TRNC-Turkish 
alliance. Turkish Cypriot side and the Turkish government signed a joint defense concept 
soon after it was announced, with the claim that any attack on the TRNC would be 
regarded as one launched on Turkey.16 Turkey's bellicose threats have met with repeated 
diplomatic answers from the Greek side. Athens always reaffirms that any attack on 
Cyprus would set into motion the joint defense doctrine between Greece and Cyprus and 
constitute a "casus belli". The motive of this doctrine is to stop the international 
community from being indifferent about the Cyprus issue. Athens declared that the 
missile purchase was a purely defensive measure while Turkey repeatedly the matter as a 
bargaining advantage. 17 
16 Taylor, J.W., and Barrett, M., "Ominous Threats to Peace on Cyprus," Washington Times, 25 
June 1998,and Europe issues, "Greek-Cypriots to Boost Defenses Despite Threat," Jane's Defense Weekly, 
V. 28, No 14, p.18, 8 October 1997 




The thesis is divided in three main parts. The first part of the thesis includes a 
brief historical overview of Cyprus regional conflict until the present time, with the 
purpose of defining the domestic aspects, the international effects and the presentation of 
implicated parties to the island's problem. Then, a review of the literature on mediation, 
which is then used as the basis for the theoretical analysis of the disputants' views and the 
significance of these positions for the process of the international mediation of Cyprus 
problem. The second part will investigate the particular aspects of the conflict and will 
signify its interaction to the international politics. Six variables; analytical contexts are 
defined to guide the study of the subject. They are the following: (1) identification of the 
conflict. Interests ofthe parties; (2) the influence of Greece and Turkey; (3) The influence 
of superpower politics; (4) the role of the NATO; (5) the United Nations with its two 
contributions, peacemaking operation in Cyprus and the continual efforts for the 
resolution ofthe conflict; and (6) the European Union and its posture to the conflict. The 
third part will be an analysis of the events that surround and explain the Cyprus regional 
conflict, justify the weakness of international mediation, the requirements of an effective 
conflict management, the efforts of main third-party-mediators until now (UN, USA and 
EU), and in the end the obstacles to a settlement of the problem. The assumptions of this 
procedure will guide the thesis to a proposal of conflict resolution with flexibility, which 
could give a permanent solution to the problem of the island. 
The study will prove the value of a successful international mediation. The 
perspective that the healthy mediation and peace building process would greatly facilitate 
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the solution of the Cyprus issue. The success of this process is dependent with the prior 
clear and objective identification of disputants' views. Additionally, the Cyprus issue can 
greatly benefit the qualities, techniques and capabilities of a third party intervention, with 
resources in his disposition. However, the analysis, with the respect to the official 
negotiating positions of the disputants parties, must also refer that the anticipation of the 
mediation's obstacles and the peacekeeping operation to the island at the present time is 
exceptional difficult, as well as the desirable solution. 
D. UTILITY 
The Cyprus problem has been on the international agenda for many years and 
most prominently since Turkey's 197 4 invasion.l8 The island, especially after his 
independence, is a place of friction and violence caused by the conflicting interests and 
intentions of the two local communities and the three guarantee forces as well NATO 
allies- Greece, Turkey and Britain. The strategic location of the island, have also 
provoked the intervention of superpower forces, USA and the former Soviet Union. In the 
18Turkey violated, especially and more clearly with the 2nd act (13-14 August) the article IV of the Treaty 
of Guarantee (London-Zurich agreements). This article did not authorize "force" when it authorizes 
"action." There is no mention of the word "force" in the Treaty. Then, Cyprus as a member of the UN since 
1960 follow the Charter of the UN. Thus, all provisions of the Zurich-London agreements in conflict with 
or inconsistent with the Charter became null and void pursuant to article 103.This article states: "In the 
event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the UN under the present Charter and their 
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under present charter shall prevail." If 
an interpretation of article IV of the Treaty of guarantee could be made to justify the use of force the all or 
part of article IV used to justify force is in conflict and inconsistent with the article 103 of UN Charter. In 
the end there is violation of article 2( 4) of the same Charter, which states' shall refrain ... from the treat or 
use of force. Article 51 authorizes the use of force for purposes of self-defense only. But, Turkey avail she 
of article 51 since the country was not attacked nor was she threatened with attack. Rossides, T.E., "Cyprus 
and the Rule of Law," Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, V. 17, No 1, spring 1991. 
15 
end, the Cyprus regional conflict is always a threat to international peace and security, 
and for this reason the involvement of UN and EU was and is inevitable. 
Not content with occupation of part of the island, Turkey has during the last 
decade of the past century embarked upon new campaign of treats against the part of 
Cyprus, which remains free. The new Turkish threats were the following: eventual 
official annexation of the occupied territories as a Turkish province, colonization of 
V arosha, and intentions of further build-up of the island. Trying to anticipate somewhat 
the overwhelming military imbalance, the official Cyprus government has undertaken an 
effort to upgrade its defence capabilities with the acquisition of modem armaments. But 
Turkey considers that Greek Cypriots should not be allowed to buy weapons in order to 
defend themselves against a new attack. At the same time, Turkey still remains an 
occupation army well equipped on a 100% level of readiness on the island. From the 
other side, war designs from either Greece or Cyprus against Turkey are unreal. Nobody 
can seriously argue that one of the two states intend to undertake an invasion ofTurkey.I9 
Years of negotiation and international initiatives have foundered on the barrier of 
Turkish party's intransigence. Its stance facilitated by the fact that the country possesses 
high geopolitical significance in the Middle East region. Thus, Turkey continues to 
maintain political advantages and occupies a serious part of the island. The international 
community remains unwilling to apply in a consistent manner the pressure that is 
necessary in order to enforce UN Security Resolutions. So Turkey and Turkish Cypriot 
19 As Hitchens illustrates: " Cyprus remains as the symbol of unresolved Greek and Turkish 
conflict. It symbolizes, for the Greeks, what a former Greek Prime minister has called the 'the shrinkage of 
Hellenism'- the pushing of Greeks and Greek life out of Asia Minor and Constantinople that took place in 
living memory." Hitchens, p.156. 
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leadership have repeatedly refused to negotiate seriously, either refusing talks on one 
pretext or another, or setting impossible preconditions in order to guarantee the failure of 
the talks. 
The successful conflict management, through the peacefully way of international 
mediation, will secure the security and peace to this island. A new failure would set a 
very dangerous precedent for the security of all small states in the world and a 
confirmation of UN validity. In contrary, a just and viable solution of the problems 
caused by the 1974 invasion would lead to a substantial improvement in relations 
between Greece and Turkey. An optimistic option is that the decision-makers of the two 
countries would promote further bilateral issues. A timely and viable resolution of the 
Cyprus problem is a strategic imperative for the NATO. The eastern Mediterranean is 
located at the centre of a volatile regional triangle comprising South-eastern Europe, the 
Middle East and the Caucasus. Given that stability in this sensitive region is impossible 
without a viable Cyprus solution that satisfies. NATO's strategic interests. It will also 
facilitate the further strengthening of Turkey's relations with the EU, the European 
integration, NATO expansion and the issue of peace in the Balkan area. 
17 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK. 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION AS AN INSTUMENT OF CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT 
The international mediation is indicative of an attempt of understanding and 
approach to the multinational relationship between third parties, the disputants' parties 
and the conflict environment. One point of clarity emerges from the literature on peace 
making is that the mediation and negotiation are well-used diplomatic tools that are 
occasionally effective and are relied upon because, although imperfect, they are the best 
we have at our disposai.20 Mediation is an extension or elaboration of the negotia:tion 
process that involves the intervention of an acceptable third party who has limited or no 
authoritative decision-making power, but in any occasion the mediator is acceptable to 
both sides. It is in other words the continuation of negotiation by other means. 21 Thus, the 
mediation consists a traditional form for the anticipating of conflicts, not so easy to apply 
with certain methods or procedures in every case because of the complicated variables. 
20 Richmond, P.O, Mediating in Cyprus, p.4, Frank Cass, 1998. Other definitions of mediation. A 
voluntary process in which those involved in a dispute jointly explores and reconciles their differences. The 
mediator has no authority to impose a settlement. His or her strength lies in the ability to assist the 
disputants in resolving their own differences. The mediated dispute is settled when the disputants 
themselves reach what they consider a workable solution (Cormich, "The Theory and Practice of 
environmental Mediation," 1980). A third party assistance to people who are trying to reach agreement in a 
controversy. There are hundreds of things a mediator can do to help, ranging from simply being present at a 
joint discussion to thinking up new ideas and arguing for them vigorously (Kresse! and Pruit, "Mediation 
Research: The Process and Effectiveness of Third-Party intervention," 1987). 
21 Moore, C., The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict, p.8, Jossey-
Bass Publishers, San Francisco, 1996. 
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During mediation, there are two separate phases. First phase covers the investigation and 
understanding of the conflict issue, and second one deals with the production of a 
compromise settlement. 
A gifted and expedient mediator ought to bring the disputants together, to control 
the process of communication, to offer incentives and guarantees during the mediation 
process and in the end to act as a medium for face-saving. Richmond points out that the 
desired compromise is dependent upon the qualities and resources of the mediator and the 
nature of the dispute environment. The effective result will greatly facilitate with one of 
the two possibilities: one is the existing will or need of disputants' parties for agreement 
and the other is the mediator's ability to act in a directive fashion. Success is often taken 
as a compromise, and in the long run mediator's resources must reinforce the 
agreement.22 An expedient mediator must also have the capability to offer a reward or 
exert pressure on disputants to participate in the process and to bring them to a settlement 
that avoid the recreation of the conflict in a short time. The success also may be product 
of the exhaustion of the disputants bargaining positions and a painful impasse, or a 
prevention of a further conflict from breaking out without the alteration of the status quo 
at the certain time. 23 
Kau:finan and Duncan advance that mediators alter disputants' perceptions of key 
elements of their decision processes. Manipulation of the information and negotiation 
processes has the effect of altering the following four elements: (1) the set of alternative 
22Riclunond, P.O., p.31. 
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actions perceived by each disputant to be individually available to themselves and to the 
others; (2) the set of consequences as perceived by each disputant; (3) the individual 
perceptions of the chance of events that may affect the conflict, including the chance 
attached to choices ofthe opponents; and (4) the preferences over consequences like costs 
or gains, including the value disputants place on each other's gains or losses.24 It is 
evident that mediation is vital in a modern world where violence is no longer an accepted 
means of diplomacy. The entrance of the new century was accompanied with a record of 
mediation operations all around the world. It is the era not of peace but of peace making 
and the techniques of mediation receive a great significance to states, communities, 
institutions or even the individuals. So, Mitchell emphasizes that the third party-
mediation is involved in a direct or procedural effort to find a solution to a conflict along 
the lines of a compromise in which concessions are exchanged according to the needs and 
relative resources of each disputant. 25This is particularly illustrated in the Cyprus issue 
where the concessions as a required element for the success of mediation is usually absent 
from the diplomatic game. The UN mediation does not always operate as a technical form 
of mediation, but the objective is the same and in a lot of occasions is the only one that 
can accomplish the mission of organizing an impartial negotiation process. Debates also 
about the intentions or advantages of mediation consist of the qualities and assets of the 
23 Hopmann, P. T, The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts ,pp. 99-
101, University of South Carolina Press, 1996. 
24 Kaufman, S., and Duncan, T.G., "A Formal Framework for Mediator Mechanisms and 
Motivations, "Journal of Conflict Resolution, V.36, no 4, pp688-691, December 1992. 
25 Mitchell, C., The Structure of International Conflict, p. 287, Macmillan: London, 1981. 
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third party, the conflict ripeness, and the level of conflict's intensity and in the end to the 
nature ofthe issues in the conflict.26 
Other arguments about the mediation endorse the element of cooperation between 
the disputants, in that the process must raise the levels of mutual dependence to such an 
extent that escalation of the conflict becomes a poor option for both sides. 27 Young 
believes that the mediation does not involve force and is intended to favor one party 
above another but aims to improve communication between the opposing sides, 
endeavoring to change their images of each other, leading to conciliation through the 
disputants' realization of their common and overlapping interests. 28 But, on the other 
hand, the mediators may often suggest compromises and may negotiate and bargain in an 
attempt to induce the opposing sides to change their stand. 29 The above elements 
introduce clearly the mediator's obligation to open new channels of communication, to 
. guide the disputants' parties to the understanding that their beliefs may be flawed and 
they must give up their intransigent attitudes. It will provide an external insight into a 
complex situation that the sides engaged in the conflict cannot objectively approach. The 
mediation process includes the reorganization of the balance of power in a manner that is 
26Kleibor, M, "Understanding the Success and Failure of International Mediation," Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, V. 40, No.2, p.362, 362. 
27 Kriesberg, I., International Conflict Resolution, p.2, Yale University Press, 1982. 
28Young, O.K., The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises, p.35, Princeton 
University press, 1967. 
29Trouval, S and Zartman, I.W, International Mediation in Theory and Practice, p.7, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1982. 
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acceptable to both sides, so creating stability in their relationship, peace and security in 
the conflict environment. It is based on the trading of concessions, assumptions of 
rationality and satisfaction of interests. While a change in the perception of the conflict as 
zero-sum would be the optimum outcome, it is more likely that the two sides will be 
increasingly motivated by the need to alter the balance of power in their own favor, in the 
process changing the stakes into items that can be used to benefit both parties. 3D 
The main intention of each side in the negotiation game is the maximization of 
advantages but from the other side a certain degree of confidential and truthful conditions 
are vital and at least a minimum level of trust must be created.3 1 There are two basic 
methods for negotiating teams to overcome agreements: the first is step-by-step, building 
agreements through mutual compromise and concessions. The second is to establish a 
formula governing the main disputed issues and then work out and elucidate the details. 
But first of all the negotiator must follow a "symmetrical process" in the sense that every 
tactic is theoretically open to both sides, depen~ing on their respective power 
relationships.32 The negotiator must be able to anticipate the opposition, control the 
procedure and m;e his experience. If the success is dependent on the building of trust, he 
must improve a good working relationship and understanding between the two sides, 
otherwise he will not exercise control to the conflict environment. 
30 Zartman, LW., and Berman, R. D., The Practical Negotiator, p.130, Yale Univ. Press, 1982. 
31 The two Cypriot communities are characterized by the lack of trust and a continuing enlarging 
gap between their official political positions 
32 Riclunond, P.O., p.9. In the Cyprus case it is difficult to identify asymmetry without analyzing 
the influence of internal and external parties in the conflict, including UN. 
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Fisher and Ury, with the experience of a lot of international negotiation efforts, 
suggest the method of "Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In: Getting to Yes" in 
order to facilitate the future efforts: (1) separate the people from the problem; (2) focus on 
interests, not positions; (3) invent options for mutual gain and (4) insist on using 
objective criteria_33 Clearly no negotiating method can guarantee success and one of the 
realities of negotiations is that one party may have a far stronger bargaining position than 
the other. At time the weaker party may be tempted to accept a deal simply to put an end 
to the matter. A negotiating party's 'bottom line' is a way of deciding in advance what is 
the worst acceptable outcome to them. However bottom lines can be rigid and not 
sufficiently flexible to take account of information learned in the negotiations or possible 
creative outcomes. Moreover bottom lines can be somewhat arbitrary, and they might 
prevent a negotiating party from agreeing to a solution which it would be wise to accept 
because they could not do better elsewhere. People negotiate to produce something better 
than the results they could obtain without negotiating- that something is the 'Best 
Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). A BATNA affords the advantage that 
is more flexible than a bottom line and can be changed in the light of new information. A 
BA TNA is the standard against which a proposed settlement should be measured. It can 
also be improved that increases the party's bargaining position. It is also important to 
consider the other party's BATNA since there is no negotiated agreement with the 
occasion that both parties have attractive BATNAs. 
33 Fisher, R., Ury, W., and Patton, B., Getting toYes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving in, 
pp 14-200, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991. It will be analysis of this method to the Cyprus regional 
conflict on chapter V. 
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The above elements introduce to the assumption that continual effort of 
negotiation or better mediation process is to avoid in any way to reach in a stalemate. At 
the same time he must assure the symmetry of the procedure and to retain his impartial 
role. The origin of stalemate by Richardson is: "neither side having sufficient resources to 
overcome the other without incurring unacceptable losses. As a stronger party would tend 
to view the mediator as a stumbling block to victory, then stalemate appears to be a 
necessary precondition for mediation to begin."34 This stalemate may provide the 
mediator with opportunity to find a settlement, but also there is the option that it may 
postpone an open conflict. However, the existing of a stalemate for a long time will guide 
the conflicting parties to an effort to change the balance of power with military or 
political means and the conflict will receive new dimensions.35 The example also of the 
Cyprus problem introduce the international politics with the case of a perpetuating 
stalemate that can exist without equality between the disputants and with an enlarging 
difficulty of finding a settlement. The efforts of international mediation until now did not 
succeed to a solution that confines the objectives and resources of conflicting parties. 
B. ETHNIC CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Ethnic conflict includes disputes over the sovereignty and the rights of ethnic 
minorities and communities. It is created by the existence of discriminatory political 
34 Richmond, P.O., p. 19. 
35 As examples we refer the acquisition of modem armaments and the improvement of diplomatic 
activities to the international communities. Cyprus is the most militarized region of the world. The 
acquisition also of Cyprus National Guard with new weapons, in 1996, created new tensions to the Cyprus 
problem. 
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institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics, or elite politics. 36 
Generally, conflict is a process in which one group perceives that its interests are being 
opposed or negatively affected by another party. Everything from partition to 
redistribution of power to the groups has been proposed to resolve the conflict. It is fact 
that the international system works uncomfortable, since the required diplomatic 
compromise and all the attempts to resolve an ethnic conflict improve in a inter-state 
level with the sensitivity by the disputants parties that is an illegal intervention to matters 
that have to do with the domestic jurisdiction and sovereignty of the state. Thus, the 
reconciliation between the ethnic disputant actors and the international system is 
necessary through the way of international mediation. 
For present purposes, the important point is the assumption that the conflict is 
motivated by rational calculations of gain. From the other point, it is relative that no 
benefit is considered a gain unless it comes at the expense of an opponent group. It is also 
argued that one or another factor is the key element in ethnic conflict, like a common 
historical past, religion or language and that its absence is what pulls them apart. Thus, to 
categorize, to synthesize, and to discriminate the various kinds of conflicts we must 
collect the required data, to definite clear criteria and to ask prudential judgment. The 
ethnic groups that emerge, as participants in ethnic conflict is really difficult to define 
their own boundaries, which may or not may not match those of outside observers or 
mediators. Mutual exclusive demands create continual political debates and very often the 
36 Brown, E.M refers to the four causes of internal conflict in Brown, E.M, Cote, 0, Lynne-Jones, 
Sand Miller, S., "Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict" Cambridge, MIT Press, 1977. 
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violence is inevitable. The presence also of foreign forces to a state complicate more the 
existing problem.37 
A critical assumption is that efforts to ameliorate ethnic conflict must be preceded 
by an understanding of the sources and patterns of the conflict. In this effort, it is useful to 
note that there is a mix of attributes that denotes group's identity. However, it is not the 
attribute that makes the group, but the group's differences that make the attribute 
important. In Cyprus case, the identification of is usually more closely with the presumed 
origins of the group and the ethnic element and hence is felt to be more fundamental to 
group identity. Pneuman and Bruehl identify the four main different sources of conflict: 
cultural, educational, experience and in the end differences in values and beliefs. 38 In 
brief, conflict resolution workshops are packages of procedures intended to influence 
both cognitive (understanding) and affective (sentiment) factors. Because there are so 
many elements it is difficult to know what is responsible for observed effects, either 
short- or long term. For example while learning about the other side's values, may be a 
subject of later negotiations. Negotiating success may be a result of the understanding 
achieved or due to the separation and, to some extent, isolation of underlying values. This 
37 It is apparent to the Cyprus case since there are British, Greek and Turkish military forces on 
the island, according to the London-Zurich agreements. 
38 Pneuman, W. R., and Bruehl, E. M., Managing Conflict, p.36, Prentice-Hall Press, 1982. All 
these sources are present in the Cyprus regional conflict. 
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comes along with the order of Fisher and Ury and Patton's method: "focus on interests, 
not positions" that facilitates the conflict management.39 
Saaty and Alexander propose a method with the following preliminary steps that a 
mediator could establish in order to understand the nature of a particular conflict: (1) 
Identification of the conflict; (2) identification of the objectives, needs, and desires of 
each of the parties; (3) identification of possible outcomes of the conflict of possible 
solutions; ( 4) assumptions about the way in which each party views its objectives and, in 
particular, its view of the relative importance of these objectives; and(5) assumptions 
about the way in which each party view the outcomes and the way in which a given 
outcome might meet the objectives. They support also that there is no single formula for 
universal application. Much is left to intuition and the experience. In general the mediator 
must not expect the disputants to give a full and fair picture of the situation. Their 
interests enforce them to emphasize their own concerns and views. Thus the necessity of 
the third party will examine with the question of how it can takes in account the interests 
and grievances ofboth parties.40. 
There have been improved a lot of theories about the conflict resolution of ethnic 
conflicts. The thesis believes that Nordlinger and Lijphart and Mitchell De-escalation 
model could have an ideal application to the Cyprus issue. First, Nordlinger enumerate 
the "Six successful conflict regulating practices": (1) stable coalition; (2) proportionality; 
39 Druckman, D., Benjamin, J.B., and Kopper, H. S., "Value differences and Conflict Resolution," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, V.32, No3, 426-430, September1988. 
40 Saaty, L. T., and Alexander, M. 1., Conflict Resolution, p.ll, Praeger Press, 1992. 
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(3) mutual veto; (4) an agreement to keep government out ofthe most contentious issues, 
"depoliticization;" (5) compromise, either on particular issues or on a package of issues; 
and (6) concessions, which differ from compromise in that they are not reciprocated.41 
Second, Lijphart, with his belief to the strength of democracy proposes: (1) grand 
coalition of all ethnic groups; (2) mutual veto in decision-making; (3) ethnic 
proportionality in the allocation of certain opportunities and offices; and ( 4) ethnic 
autonomy, often expressed in federalism.42 Additionally, the major determinant of the 
effectiveness of measures to reduce ethnic conflict is the content of measures adopted. 
But before examining the results of these policies two other matters warrant 
consideration. First the motives of policy-makers and the proper decision- making 
process and second the timing of policy innovation for a comprehensive settlement that 
needs reciprocal concessions.43 
Mitchell defines the problem of escalation and de-escalation as a function of the 
life cycle of a conflict. In protracted regional conflicts, like the Cyprus issue, and he 
remarks: "protracted conflicts can pass through a wide variety of stages in their 'life-
cycle.' Moreover, this progression may not be linear, in the sense that some conflicts 
circle back to earlier stages and might pass through both malign and benign cycles of 
41 Nord1inger, E., Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, p.21, Univ. Press of America, 1982. 
42 Lijphart, A., Democracy in Plural Societies, p.35, Yale Univ. Press, 1977. 
43 Williams, P., "Crisis Management," p.71, John Wiley & Sons, 1982. 
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interaction several times" (See Figure1).44Basic trial of a serious mediation effort for the 
Cyprus problem will be the building of trust of the two Cypriot communities with the 
organization of a proper pre-negotiation process. It is the only way that may guide to 
reciprocal concessions and withdrawal of the impasse. 
Figure 1: Dynamic Protraction Model of Conflict, Mitchell. 
The success of this model applies mostly to the "negotiating flexibility'' that the 
mediator must have. It is indicated by a willingness to move from initial positions, and by 
an observed shi~ from rather rigid and tough bargaining postures toward an agreement. 
The effects of a number of situational variables on decisions to be flexible or inflexible 
were explored in different international occasions. So, Druckman improves four 
negotiating-stages, each consisting of a particular combination of variables, different for 
each case. The analysis of these variables revealed trajectories of factors leading to 
44 Mitchell, R. C., "Problem -Solving Exercises and theories of Conflict Resolution," in Conflict 
Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application, edited by Sandole, J.D., and Merwe, H., 
p.87, New York: Manchester University Press, 1994. 
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agreement or to a stalemate for a certain conflict. Both Mitchell and Druckman 




B.Setting the stage 
C. The give and 
take 
D. The endgame 
Variables 
a. Positions linked or not to political ideologies. 
b. Representing your government ·as either the 
primary representative. 
C.Planning as either strategizing or studying the 
issues. 
d. Familiarity with opponents. 
e. Amiable or antagonistic relations among 
parties. 
a. Location of talks at either a central or 
peripheral location. 
b. Format of meetings as formal or informal. 
c.Seeking either comprehensive or partial 
agreements. 
donation has a power advantage or a power 
disadvantage. 
e.The b, d, and e variables of A stage are also 
repeated in this stage. 
a. The existence or no coordination points. 
b. Other parties make many or few concessions. 
c. Conference leadership is innovative or not. 
d. Media coverage is light or heavy. 
e.The variable d of B stage is repeated in this 
stage. 
a. A deadline either exists or does not exist. 
b. There is or is not an attractive alternative to a 
negotiated agreement (BATNA). 
c. A solution is suggested by a mediator or by the 
other parties. 
d. The variables a and d of C stage are repeated 
in this stage. 
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C. DIFFICULTIES OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
Two are the serious factors that have to do with the application of the international 
mediation to the international politics. The first refers to the nature and legitimacy of 
mediation, and the second to the context provided by the international system. The 
international system lends wings to the factor of ethnicity according to its state-centric 
structure or the existing threat for "the balance of power."46There is need for a detailed 
examination of the immense amount of information and variables since all the past 
efforts, mainly by international organizations such as UN, has rarely been successful 
unless the disputants themselves have shown a clear a clear and unequivocal commitment 
to the process. The successful third party mediation was the result of flexing military, 
political or financial muscles on the part of the mediator who had great resources in his 
disposition.47 Berridge supports that a settlement of this kind is a result of two basic 
preconditions: "ripe moments" and "hurting stalemates."48 In other words, the disputants 
will arrive to a settlement or a compromise because they have exhausted all zero-sum 
options or they are satisfied by the third party proposition, which assure great benefits or 
rewards for their future. Except in rare cases where there is strong interest by foreign 
forces to inject capital into a regional conflict to persuade or enforce the disputants to 
46 Martin Wight distinguishes different meanings of the term. Some of them: (1) the existing 
distribution of power; and (2) the principle of equal aggrandizements of the great powers at the expense of 
the weak. It is from "International Relations," Penguin Reference, 1997, p.41. 
47 See the example of Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel. It have been focused on 
the mutual respective relations of disputants, and gains from, as well as a strong third party mediator, the 
USA. 
48 Berridge, R., Diplomacy and Practice, p.22, Hemel Press, 1995. 
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arrive to a settlement, focusing on preserving the certain status quo for its own purpose, 
the alternative and more common arrangement, it could be of the sort illustrated by the 
Cyprus case, in which the conflict is contained indefinitely, but the international 
community will not invent enough resources and there is not the existing and richly in 
resources third party mediator with individual interests to bring the two parties to a final 
solution. 
The end of the Cold War enforce the international community to evaluate its 
system in the light of violent, latent ethnic disputes, the shifts towards regionalism and 
the inability of the system to satisfy both the interests of the states and the interests of 
ethnic groups. The changes have produced by the fact that states are unwilling to 
relinquish their dominant rights and a reaction by ethnic groups- minorities, which find 
themselves trapped in states and desire to vindicate new political, social and economic 
rights. New threats aroused to the post-WW II international states system, based to the 
power of the permanent Security Council members and the supporting of the basic 
principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and the inflexible territorial control of states. 
To this era, the international mediation has tended to result mainly in fragile non-
permanent compromises and always in acceptance by the interests and resources of great 
powers that expressed their intentions in regional and systemic stability. The post Cold 
War conflict management concentrated in a UN' s wide utilization peacekeeping 
operations to stabilize regional conflicts and experimental efforts of peace-enforcement in 
order to rebuild and sustain failed states. This procured the lack of credibility to the 
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mediation process, in particular, in regions where the international community does not 
have sufficient interests at stake to intervene.49 
A serious assumption is that system is happy to isolate and stabilize, but have 
abandoned attempts to bring a harmony or solution to regional intractable conflicts. This 
term refers more to the failure of its efforts to make decisive progress. Intractable disputes 
have nonetheless been significantly advanced by third party mediation. This is because 
the international system is status quo oriented and the mediators finding themselves often 
able to do little since the disputants improve devious objectives and efforts of reaping 
benefits by the third party. Thus, the third party is content to sustain the status quo and 
ignore the existence of the disputants' devious objectives. But if during the time of 
procedure the devious objectives are identified, the third party must act immediately 
otherwise the negotiations will continue on a futile level and the conflict will not recede, 
like the since 1964 Cyprus case.so 
In more of the cases the international mediation has merely attempt to prevent a 
further deterioration of the states system and the associated regional and global situation. 
The mediation in ethnic disputes favors more representative power- sharing arrangements 
within states and avoid the creation of new states or even an alteration of the international 
system. 51 In the case of Cyprus the international community retain an official state 
according to the treaties of the independence of the island. This framework justifies the 
49 Hopmann, P.T., pp.l95-210. 
50 Richmond, R. 0., p.61. 
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application of international law and norms. The intervention also in the form of mediation 
occurred very late, did not succeed to prevent the further violence, and after twenty-six 
years aim at producing a power-sharing arrangements within a new federal state in a 
future period. From the other side the reinforcement of Turkish Cypriot community by the 
Turkish intervention and interests and new security dilemmas- because of the different 
military capabilities of the disputants- enforced the Greek Cypriot side to move their 
position to a single state, but with two relatively autonomous administrations. 52 
The new century entered with the problem of the spillover of ethnic internal 
conflicts into other states, with new threats for the peace and security of the international 
system and an indication of the declining legitimacy of the current form of the state. As 
Ryan emphasizes it is extremely difficult for the international community to apply 
objective judgment and to resolve conflicting claims of historical legitimacy, self-
determination, economic viability and regional security.53 There are a lot of arguments 
about this matter. Can it allow such states to split into new separate states or at least 
autonomous units within a state, or no? Kaufmann has argued that the only answer to 
ethnic conflict i~ the separation of failed states into separate defensive enclaves to prevent 
hardening of ethno-nationalist rhetoric because of atrocities, and the security dilemma a 
51 The case of former Yugoslavia does not follow this principle for separate reasons. But the cases 
of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia or the Croats in Bosnia accept that that the concept of secession is far less 
opposed in the present international system. 
52 Lund, M., Preventing Violent Conflicts, pp.3-27, United States Institute ofPeace Press, 1996. 
53 Ryan, S .. , Ethnic Conflict and International Relations, p.38, Alders hot: Dartmouth, 1990. 
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provided by the intermingling of populations. 54 But Touval argues that the international 
community should remain very reluctant to sacrifice the principle of territorial integrity to 
self-determination, and should avoid admitting unstable entities into statehood. He 
mentions also the danger of a territorial reform to tum an ethnic conflict into an 
international one, and therefore that a simpler option is greater observance of group and 
minority rights.55 The mediators to these situations have immense problems since each 
party can invoke separate international principles to support its positions. fu a ethnic 
conflict the best the mediator can achieve is to bring the disputants to an agreement 
amongst themselves about any modification of the sovereignty or the lessening of 
demands for ethnic self-determination, assuming that it can establish a credible position 
while trying to maintain a cease-fire status quo with the dismissal of the third and more 
harder alternative of mediation result, the war-drawn situation (the other two alternatives 
are reconciliation and separation). 
D. THE UN AS A MEDIATOR OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS 
The Charter authorizes the UN to function in a mediator capacity in order to 
undertake to bring conflict situations that fall beyond the domestic jurisdiction of a state 
to a settlement. 56 The disputants in these cases perceive the role of UN as impartial with 
54 Chaim Kaufmann in Brown, M., Cote, 0., Lynne-Jones, S., and Miller, s., "Nationalism and 
Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, MIT Press, 1977)" p. 266. 
55 Touval, S., Gaining Entry to Mediation in Communal Strife p.266, Rutledge, London, 1993. 
The contradiction between Kaufmann and Trouval positions creates the three different solutions- options 
of Cyprus problem: De facto partition, reintegration and maintaining of the status quo. 
56 Article 2(7), UN Charter. The UN has no authority to intervene in such cases, unless under 
circumstances covered in Chapter VII. Nor has a state any obligation to submit to UN involvement. The 
involvement is only in cases with dander to the international peace and security. 
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no interests at stake other than those outlined in the Charter. In the Cyprus case the 
weakness of the UN mediation lies on the nature of the conflict and in its lack of 
resources to enforce disputants towards agreement to a permanent solution. The 
organization, with the means that has in his disposition, asks moral pressure and 
organizes the communication process, on procedure and on the trust and the political will 
of the disputants. Therefore, it seems that the UN mediator have positive contribution 
when operates in coalition with one or several of the members of the Security Council. 
The superpower involvement assures for the organization a level of international . 
consensus and provides the necessary means for the accomplishment of his mission. The 
latest with its ability to provide legitimacy, donates the organization with capabilities to 
identify grounds for conciliation and to minimize the required time for a settlement 
between the disputants. 57 Instead the USA as an independent mediator disposes the 
required resources for a dynamic settlement of the dispute and the history of Cyprus 
regional conflict can prove it. 58 
57Mediation and good offices consist instruments of conflict management for the UN. The 
organization for this reason must have flexibility and mutual respect with the disputants' parties. Article 3 
of Chapter 2 of the UN Charter requires that all members of the organization to settle their disputes 
peacefully and without endangering international peace, security and justice. Article 33(1) of the Charter 
calls all members of the UN to settle their disputes through mediation. Article 33(2) gives to the Security 
Council the power to call on the parties to the dispute to use such means to settle the dispute. Chapter VI of 
the Charter gives to the Council the power for maintaining of the international peace through the ways of 
recommendation and search and Charter VII with the power to enforce its resolutions. The latest measures 
in conjunction with peacekeeping operations establish the organization as a perfect mediator in order to 
attempt to prevent or to resolve conflicts. 
58 See Johnson's appeals, 1963. Following the outbreak of violence in December 1963, the US 
President Lyndon Johnson appealed to the leaders of the two Cypriot communities to cease military attacks. 
A new US mediator effort in September 1967 saved a danger of a new Greek- Turkish confrontation for the 
island's issue. 
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General custom and practice has seen the Secretary-general's office playing the 
role of facilitator but this intervention critically depends upon the support of the 
permanent members of the Security Council. In the post Cold war system, the complex 
decision-making process within the Security Council means that building and then 
maintaining a consensus behind a particular mediatory stance may be difficult. The nature 
of the consensus in the most of the cases is extremely difficult. Roberts and Kingsbury 
have argued that the UN's contribution is viewed as "being less in the field of peace 
between the major powers, than with respect to defusing regional conflict, advocating 
self-determination, assisting desalinization, codifying international law, protecting human 
rights and providing a possible framework for social and economic improvement."59 
The UN needs two conditions for intervention of ethnic conflicts before become 
violent: first authority and second humanitarian and military resources on constant 
readiness. The options for action include the application of diplomatic pressure, 
humanitarian relief, observation and monitoring, good offices, economic sanctions. The 
aim is to restore order, end violence, relieve suffering, initiate negotiations that lead to 
agreements and settlements, apply international law and norms, promote human right and 
democratic government, punish oppressive regimes. The action must be also cohesive, 
determined, occur at the beginning of crises or when players are exhausted and they are 
persuaded to honor the conditions that the international system dictates. 60 
59 Roberts, A., and Kingsbury, B., United Nations: Divided World, p.l9, Oxford University Press, 
1996. 
60 Stack, F.J., and Hebron, L., The Ethnic Entanglement: Conflict and Intervention in World 
Politics, pp26-30, Praeger Press, 1999. 
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III. THE DISPUTE'S PARTIES AND CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT 
A. IDENTIFICATION OF THE CONFLICT 
The post-colonial problem of Cyprus can be divided into two phases. The first 
phase covers the period from the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus until 1974. 
During this period the conflict was basically internal between the two Cypriot 
communities in which external powers became involved. The disputes had a bicommunal 
character of Cypriot society, inherent with in the state-building process. The political 
situation became different with the improvement of three different factors: (1) The 
external intervention, 6I (2) the different ethno-political orientations of Greek and Turkish 
Cypriot communities and (3) the provisions of the 1960 settlement of the colonial 
problem under the London-Zurich settlement.62 Britain's refusal to the Greek-Cypriot 
demands for self-determination and union with Greece in 1954, provoke not only the 
five-year Greek-Cypriot uprising against colonial rule, but also the introduction of 
Turkey with Britain's aid as a party of equal standing in the Cypnis issue in the 1955 
London Conference. The purpose of this British action was to blunt the Greek and Greek-
Cypriot pressures. Briefly, as it was also referred to the first chapter of this thesis, a great 
61 We talk about confrontation between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, the former colonial 
power that tried to protect its interests and the superpower involvement at the political level. The island was 
added on the list of peripheral points of Cold War friction. The Cyprus problem introduced to the regional, 
ideological, political and military considerations of external powers. 
63. The agreements consisted of a series of treaties, which laid the foundations of the political 
governance of the republic of Cyprus. These treaties were the treaty of establishment, the treaty of alliance, 
the treaty of guarantee, and the agreement on the basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus. With the 
establishment of these treaties the island became independent. 
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part of the provisions were not only awkward and unworkable, but also rigid and created 
greater differences between the two communities. The constitution prohibited from hid 
construction any amendment of its provisions. Thus, there was no possibility or the two 
communities to negotiate, to adjust their positions, and seek common ground to bridge 
their differences. For this reason it was characterized as "a constitutional oddity'' 63and "a 
constitutional straitjacket precluding that adaptation essential to the growth and survival 
of any body politic."64 A confrontation between the two communities was inevitable 
because of a state without experience in self-government, conflicting ethno political aims, 
mistrust, and insecurity sentiments between the two Cypriot communities. 65 The social 
activities of the two Cypriot communities were closely related to distinct religious beliefs 
and practices, ethnic holidays, and cultural traditions. Especially, the separate ethnic 
celebrations, with the use of the motherland's national anthems and flags, reminded the 
members of the two communities of its different ethnic lines, roots and loyalties and that 
the Cypriot state did not fulfill their ethnic aspirations. These were reasons for the failing 
ofbuilding a working state, despite the great effort of the Greek Cypriot government side, 
since the other, Turkish Cypriot side, gained for the first time after the colonial era 
63 According to the report ofMediator Galo Plaza to the UN, 26 March 1965. 
64 Glend Camp, "Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus," Political Science Quarterly, vol.95, p.49 
65 In the professional field and party organizations, the two communities were largely self-
sufficient. They had separate political parties, professional organizations, and labor organizations with uni-
ethnic membership. Ethnic contradictions also undermined the establishment of a university and a 
educational unity of the two communities. The textbooks and the programs of education imported from the 
two motherlands. The two communities had their own newspapers and publications that were mostly 
presenting biased ethnic views and conflicting positions. Publications imported from Greece and Turkey 
emphasizing the antagonism and created mutual bias and fears. Intermarriage was extremely rare, since it 
carried with social and religious stigma. In the end, there were language problems to the intercommunal 
communication. The public documents were printed in three languages: English, Greek and Turkish. 
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privileges and rights that they could not wish to miss. Thus, the Turkish Cypriot 
community imposed continually confrontational tactics and continual blame casting, with 
the covering of the constitution. All the rest, including violent fighting, gradual 
segregation, further complications and external involvement followed almost naturally. 
The sequence of events was neither pleasant nor justified. Concern over the impact of the 
Cyprus dispute on the cohesion of NATO's southeastern flank, and the possibility of a 
Greco-Turkish war over Cyprus, provoked the international initiatives on the part of the 
USA, NATO and UN in the decades of 1950s and 1960s 
By 1974, the problem was entered in a new phase with the nature of the problem 
changing dramatically Main characteristic is a state of stagnation, basically consisting of 
the clashing claims and concerns of the two local communities, Greece, Turkey, Britain 
and the two superpowers. The Turkish invasion added new elements to the problem 
without removing the old ones. The forced movement and exchange of population, which 
led to ethnic segregation, have been widening with the gap between the Cypriot 
communities and undermining efforts and prospects for reunification. The new dominant 
elements and parameters of the problem since 1974 are the de facto partition and the 
military occupation of the northern part of the island by Turkey. But the initial problem of 
establishing a viable state for all Cypriots has been further complicated by fourth 
parameter, which is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership in 1983.66 The UN and other international organizations had deplored this as 
66 The declaration of the independence of the " Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" was made 
on 16 November 1983. On 13 Feb 1975 the Turkish Cypriots had unilaterally proclaimed the "Turkish 
Federated State of Cyprus." 
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legally invalid, and no other country besides Turkey has recognized the statehood. The 
Turkish Cypriot community has been putting more priority on succession and the creation 
of a second state on the island rather than on the efforts to settle the problem on the basis 
of a single state with a bizonal and bicommunal federal state. 67 The official Turkish 
political position denies a settlement based on a unified federal Cyprus. Looking at the 
efforts of the Turkish side to secure recognition for a separate state in the northern part of 
the island, there is the impression that there is no minimum goal shared by the two sides. 
Despite the rhetoric declarations about a settlement that would reunite the island as a 
federal state clearly for political reasons, Turkish policy intends to divide the island along 
ethnic lines.68 
B. GREEK CYPRIOT PARTY 
Greek Cypriots felt that the London-Zurich agreements deprived them of their 
rights and that they were unjustly imposed on the will of majority. By 1963, the Greek 
Cypriot continual demand is the revision of the Constitution's articles that could facilitate 
the functioning of the Cypriot state.69 This was for this party the main objective of 
intercommunal talks ofthe period 1968-74. The official position was the establishment of 
67 The Resolution 541 of Security Council, on 18 Nov 1983, condemned the unilateral 
declaration as following: (I) deplores the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported 
succession of part of Cyprus; (2) considers the declaration referred to above as legally invalid and calls for 
the withdrawal; (3) calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and 
non-alignment of Cyprus; (4) calls upon all states not to recognize any Cypriot State other than the Republic 
of Cyprus. 
68 Kaloudis, G., p.S. 
69 Kyriakides. A., Constitutionalism and Crises Government, p.66, Pennsylvania Univ. Press, 
1966. 
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a unitary, sovereign, and independent republic of Cyprus, with majority rule and minority 
rights, with a sufficient revision of the 1959 constitution, due to these above mentioned 
reasons. This Greek Cypriot political scene was radically changed by two serious 
historical events: the Greek-sponsored coup against the government of Cyprus and the 
following Turkish invasion, 1974. The question in the aftermath of 1974, was how to 
reconstructure Cyprus into a viable federal zone, and territorially into a hi-zonal system, 
especially after the 1975 population exchange, and the expulsion of nearly all Greek 
Cypriots from the occupied areas. Basic also party's intentions the unity and territorial 
integrity of the state, the protection of human rights of all the Cypriots, and the departure 
of all occupied military forces from the island. They express also their indignation for the 
presence of tens of thousands Turkish mainland settlers brought in Cyprus, after the 1974 
invasion.7° 
The official Cyprus government faced serious security dilemmas since 1974.71 
The military threat from the north enforced the government to make some serious 
concessions without the reciprocal action from the Turkish Cypriot side since 1977.72 
This was extremely painful according the difficult negotiating position of Greek-Cypriot 
70 The idea of federation as a solution appeared as a viable alternative. This had been rejected 
prior to 1974, not by the official Cyprus government, but from political personalities like Lord Radcliffe in 
1956, the UN mediator Galo Plaza, as an unworkable solution for the island. 
71 Boyne notes that Greek Cypriots are spending, on average, US $2 million a day on armaments. 
There is no intention of attacking in the north. They want sophisticated weaponry so that they will be able to 
hold off the aggressors long enough to allow the international community to intervene in any occasion that 
they will accept attack from the north side of the island. Boyne, S., "Moves to Settle the Cypriot Problem," 
Jane's Intelligence Review, V.7, No 9, p.405, Sep 1995. 
72 It is the four guidelines included in the communique issued of the meeting President Makarios 
and Turkish -Cypriot leader Raouf Denktash, on Feb 12 1977. It was formally accepted the principle of 
federation and the hi-zonal territorial character, but before the beginning of negotiations. 
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side in that period.73 To the international forum the party had only verbal support as the 
victim's side that accepted violations of international law, justice and morality. In the 
political field there were two main intentions: the resettlement of the refugees, and a 
dynamic economic development. But the good economic results procured and serious 
negative consequences. It allowed some degree of rationalization of the consequences of 
the Turkish invasion by the international community. However, the refugees remain a 
major pressure group in the Cypriot political scene, motivated by their strong attachment 
to their land and properties. Thus, every Cypriot government since 1974 support that any 
viable solution must account the return of refugees to their homes and the three basic 
freedoms -human rights: free movement, the right of having property and the right of 
settlement for all the habitants ofthe island.74 
The Greek Cypriot leadership is still recognized as the legitimate government of 
the "Republic of Cyprus (1960)." Therefore, it has been enjoyed almost all ofthe foreign 
aid, especially from the EU, and it is representing the whole island on international 
platforms. The Greek Cypriot leadership wants to rule the island according to the fact that 
it possesses the majority of the island's population. For this reason, what the Greek 
Cypriot side support to the table of negotiations as the best solution is to have a "unitary 
state," to maintain its power of self-rule and sovereignty. But they know well according to 
the international situation that is very difficult to put the Turkish Cypriots in a minority 
73 We note: 40% of the Greek Cypriot population unrooted, about 5000 had died and about 1600 
persons were still listed as missing. 
74 Koufoudakis Van: "Greek Cypriot politics and the Peacemaking Process," in Salem, Norma: 
"Cyprus a regional Conflict and its Resolution," Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 
Ottawa: StMartin's Press, 1989 p. 26. 
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status in a unitary state. So the current status remains the same. The recent concerns, such 
as the dynamic effort of entering the EU with some progress to the problem of the isle or 
the increasing number of North Cyprus' population due to the immigrants from Turkey, 
might have a driving force to the attitude of the Greek Cypriot leadership towards a 
negotiated solution, i.e., to negotiate with the Turkish Cypriot leadership for the 
establishment of a bi-commui?-al federation, including strong central powers, certain 
territorial concessions from the north and the removal of Turkish troops from the island. 
However, for the time being the current status quo is the Greek Cypriot side's BATNA. 
C. TURKISH CYPRIOT PARTY 
The Turkish Cypriots are the heirs of the Ottoman bureaucracy and land-owning 
class since 1571, the year of conquest. A part oftheir power remained during the years of 
British colonial rule, since the governors continued to use them in administrative 
positions. Turkish Cypriots have a strong cultural, historical, and nationalistic attachment 
to Turkey. 75 Their reaction to the EOKA -the union of Greek Cypriot fighters for 
liberation of the island from the British colonial government- was the creation of the 
KTP- Turkish party of Cyprus- with held as ideology the partition of the island into 
different ethnic zones. In the period between 1960 until 1963 they participate to the bi-
communal government of Republic of Cyprus. Their leader, the Vice-President Dr 
Kucuk, supported a partition ideology. The Turkish Cypriot part of government worked 
75 Turkish Cypriots are Sunni Muslims. The original Turkish Cypriot settlers were principally 
drawn from the Lala Mustafa Pasha's soldiers, thirty thousand of whom were given fiefs on the island by 
Sultan Selim II. Salih I H., "Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State," p. 4, University of 
Alabama Press, 1978. 
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for the interests of its respective community. Thus, the two communities offered different 
solutions or policies for each concrete situation and the Republic broke down. Since 
1963, this party excluded from the administrative force of the island and gathered in their 
regions in towns. This isolation brought them a certain political homogeneity. It has also 
serious economic consequences since they didn't participate to the economic 
development and the luxury of full-fledged statehood. 
The majority of the Turkish Cypriot community has the experience of the 
intercommunal dispute of the first years of the Cyprus Republic, the division of the island 
into two different zones and the exchange of population, which followed the 1974 
Turkish invasion. All these elements provided this party with a political space of their 
own and the first aim of the party's leadership has been the consolidation of the present 
situation, with the creation of a new state with political nationalist ant the economical 
development. What counts for the Turkish Cypriots is the right to administer their own 
affairs, on their own piece of land under the effective guarantee of Turkey. These are the 
main principles of this party during the past and present intercommunal talks. It would 
not be wrong to suggest that the solution envisaged by this party is theoretically nearer to 
a confederation than a fully constituted federation, or in other words a hi-zonal state with 
political equality. It is also fact that the citizens of the unrecognized "TRNC" are getting 
worried about their political isolation from the outer world. 76 This situation makes it hard 
76 A report of Omestad for the U.S News magazine refers the following points about the difficult 
position of Turkish Cypriots in the present time: " Time is another foe working against reunification. 
Settlers from mainland Turkey have been arriving in numbers that now rival the native Turkish Cypriots. At 
the same time, Turkish Cypriots, unable to fmd work, are rapidly departing: more now reside in Britain than 
in Cyprus ... Economic tensions play a role in perpetuating enmity. While international aid has poured into 
the booming south, the years of partition and sanctions have hammered the northern Cyprus economy. 
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for them to become economically self-sufficient and instead depending on Turkey. The 
fact that they ruled themselves for 30 years with serious economic capabilities may 
influence the negotiations in the future. In any way, just like the Greek Cypriot 
leadership, the current status quo is the Turkish Cypriot leadership's BATNA. As an 
assumption one can state that the two communities in the Cyprus conflict have been 
seeing the issue from the realist perspective. For them, all states want to maximize their 
gains and they act according to their own interests. The nature of the conflict is the 
interaction for power and scarce resources. In this perspective, the two sides always took 
inflexible and tough positions in the negotiations and mediations with the UN Secretary 
General. 
D. GREEK PARTY. 
The interest of Greece in Cyprus issue derives from the ethnic, religious, linguistic 
and cultural ties linking the majority of the population of the island. The Greeks arrived 
in the B.C. years, settled, proliferated, and never departed. The Greek independence 
movement that united Greece as a liberal state would have concluded the island had it the 
necessary resources, especially military capability to achieve it. During the last century, 
Greece has suffered attack, occupation, civil war, and mixed democratic and authoritarian 
periods of government. Besides, he tried to liberate regions in Middle East, according to 
Turkish Cypriots complain angrily about their isolation, saying it is driving them into the arms of Turkey 
and forcing friends and family to emigrate. The EU has barred Turkish Cypriots exports of citrus and other 
crops and levied prohibitive tariffs on the area's manufactured goods. To evade the sanctions, Turkish 
Cypriot businesses funnel Europe-Bound products through Turkey. Mail and phone connections also run 
trough Turkey. The only foreign tourists who don't have to pass through Turkey are day-trippers staying in 
the south. Tourism remains the south's No.I industry but lags in the north, despite fme beaches and Greco-
Roman antiquities. Turkey has had to bankroll the north, covering half its annual budget. Omestad, T., "The 
Perils and Benefits of a Separated Cyprus," U.S. News, 15 December 1997. 
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its Byzantine historical heritage. After this adventure, it could be extremely dangerous to 
expand its sovereignty to an island hundred of miles to the east. The underestimation of 
eastern neighbor and his adventure in 1924 created fears for a repetition of a same 
mistake.77 During the decade of the 1950s, Greece tried with political means to succeed 
the demand of the Greek Cypriots for a political union with the motherland. By the end of 
this decade the Greek government realized that the intention of a union was excessive and 
prejudicial for its foreign policy, within the NATO area. With the Britain's enforcement 
the government followed a deal with the Turkey, publicly forsaked the union- 'enosis' -, 
and instructed the leader of Greek-Cypriot majority to accept the limited achievement of 
independence for Cyprus without a political union with Greece. 
The Greek governments of 1955-63 and from 1974 on until present time 
subordinated the accommodation to the wishes of the Greek-Cypriot leadership to 
avoidance of conflict with the eastern neighbor, though an aroused Greek public required 
Greece to sponsor anti-British resolutions before the UN S.C in the middle and the late 
1950s, and to withdraw Greek forces from NATO's integrated military structure in 1974. 
The Greek military junta was to collapse soon after the 197 4 failed coup d'etat in Cyprus, 
but a conference in Geneva involving the three guarantors -Britain, Greece and Turkey-
broke down in August of the same year, signaling the resumption of the Turkish forces' 
offensive. Greece' complicity in these events is self-evident, yet Turkey's involvement 
has undoubtedly produced the greatest impact on the present structure of intercommunal 
relations on the island. Briefly, Greece has concluded Cyprus as an integral part of 
77 Bitsakis, E.," Nationalism and Compliance," Ta Nea, 21 Jan.2000. 
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country's sphere of defence and with the Greek Cypriot government there is a strong 
political and military cooperation. In the last years of past century there was a rapidly 
growing involvement of Greek and, for that matter, Turkish military personnel and 
hardware in Cyprus' military affairs with participation of the two countries in separate 
annual military exercises. Basically, Greece does not want a strong Turkish power in the 
island since most of the population of the island identify themselves as Greeks (the Greek 
Cypriots). This is an advantage in Greece's side, even though Cyprus is 600 miles away 
from mainland Greece- in comparison to its distance of 40 miles from Turkey. 78 
Greece is fundamentally a status quo country in a part of the world where the 
status quo is being challenged from many directions. Worried about the instability on its 
northern frontier, it also perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity emanating from 
Turkey. However Greece has a strong interest in the economic development and political 
stability of Turkey and intends the improvement of good relations and cooperation in 
various activities. The continuing problem of Cyprus affects directly the two countries, 
the military build-up on both sides, and the repeated threats of war from Turkish generals 
and politicians are not "figments ofthe otherwise fertile imagination of the Greeks."79 
78 A former prime Minister of Greece had observed that the relation of Turkey and Greece is like 
a triangle and the third comer of it is the USA. Greece a lot of times recognized the stabilizing role of USA 
for the region. One new factor about the tragedy of Cyprus have maybe added, especially after the editing of 
the memoirs of former Secretary of State Kinsinger at the time of the invasion, the Watergate. It provoked a 
temporary problem of governance in the USA. This fact was exploited with a lot of audacity by the Turkish 
side. Kaphis. P, "Our Gently Blindness," Ta Nea, 18 December 1999. 
79 Tsoukalis, L., " Greece Like Any Other European Country," The National Interest, No. 
55,pp.65-74, Spring 1999. Greece is now receiving praise from European and American political leaders for 
its moderation in the foreign policy field, its stabilizing role in the Balkan area, its cooperative stance in 
dealing with the internal crisis in Albania, the problem of Kosovo, the non-deployment of the S-300 
missiles on Cyprus, his substantial contribution of acceptance of Turkey as a candidate member of EU and 
in the end for its admission to European Monetary Union by the 2001. 
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E. TURKISH PARTY 
The interest of Turkey in Cyprus likewise derives from the religious, linguistic 
ethnic and cultural ties linking the Turkish Cypriot population. Their policy applies 
mostly to the contention that Turkish Cypriots is one the two communities sharing the 
island and only this count more than the size of the population of the each ethnic 
community. The constitutional recognition in the settlement of 1960 and sufficient 
representation in Republic's bureaucracy and governance was a first step to the country's 
intentions. Dobell emphasizes more this diplomatic achievement with the ascertainment 
that there has never been sizeable individual Greek-Turkish bilingualism, or statistically 
significant cultural intermarriage during any period of Cypriot civilization and history. 
Nor has there been frequent civil war. During the British rule Muslim and Christian 
citizens lived at peace. 80 
The Turks as the heirs to the Ottoman Empire improve any claim on the island 
from their conquest of the island in 1571, but its validity was never brought into question 
under international law.81 They entered again to the diplomatic game with the discreet 
prompting of the British government, it was reasserted as a counter to the Greek Cypriot 
liberation movements. It is under question if the Turkish Cypriot community could have 
ever obtained power for a hi-communal constitution without the 1960 British-Turkish 
involvement. The Turkish military force in Cyprus (650 soldiers according to the 
80 William Dobell: " Cyprus as a Regional Conflict," in Salem, Norma: "Cyprus a Regional 
Conflict and its Resolution," Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa: StMartin's 
Press, 1989 p. 49. 




involvement. The Turkish military force in Cyprus (650 soldiers according to the 
settlement package) was increased or decreased by many thousands as different crises 
took place. On occasions where the prospect of a unitary Cypriot constitution or the 
implementation of union seemed imminent, Turkey threatened military intervention. This 
occurred in 1964 and 1967 even before the since 1974 full-scale invasion. In the last date 
the historical facts donate them with an ideal opportunity to extend their domination of 
the northern Cyprus with the justification that they protect the Turkish Cypriots. 
For Turkey, Cyprus has an abiding strategic interest. Their proposition to the 
island's settlement is the autonomy of the Turkish Cypriot community, now controlled by 
Turkey, under conditions, which would prevent the recurrence of a Greek-Cypriot 
political domination. Turkey's strong desire for a full-membership in the EU enforces 
them to present incentives for this direction. But at the same time they support that it is 
forbidden for them to withdraw their troops from the island and to leaving 150, 000 Turks 
with 600,000 Greeks without sound guarantees. It is also necessary to refer to the belief 
of a serious part of Turkish Public opinion that criticize with a austere way the political 
and economic costs of Turkey's commitment that are indeed high.82 
There is now recognition in Turkey that its strategic position has a new value for 
its important Western allies. Rather than a bulwark against Soviet communism, there is 
today an emphasis on its role as a bridge to, and stabilizing influence upon an even more 
uncertain and unpredictable Middle East. But Ankara appreciates that this game is risky. 
82 We note the unpleasant complications with the principal Western allies, the forsaken American 
aid due to the after 1974 embargo, the continuing efforts of Greek lobby as well as the interaction to the 
international public opinion and the application of international law. 
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Mismanagement of the changed strategic environment could decrease the value of its 
Western connections, but to adopt too Western a perspective on Middle Eastern issues 
could exacerbate Turkish internal strains and diminish its regional influence. 83 However 
first priority of its policy at this time is the western orientation. For more than 40 years 
following Turkey's accession to NATO, the strategic interdependence of Turkey and the 
North Atlantic powers sustained close foreign policy alignment. Despite the Cyprus issue 
and occasional Western qualms over the character of Turkish domestic politics, the 
mutually beneficial strategic relationship was never blown off course. Today, and 
especially because of the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate-member of EU, the 
circumstances are different, national interests are diverging, and Turkey's political 
establishment is no longer confident that Turkey's Western orientation of the past era is 
best for the future. The new political and strategic environment makes it inevitable that 
Turkey's political leadership will pursue a more distinctive, nationalistic foreign policy, 
not always compatible with the interests and preferences of its old North Atlantic 
partners. 84 
F. THE SUPERPOWER POLITICS TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 
The exploration of the causes, process, and consequences of American and Soviet 
involvement in the Cyprus issue has shown that the role played by the two superpowers in 
shaping developments on and around Cyprus was extremely sufficient. They were also 
83 Wyllie, J., "Turkey-Adapting to New Strategic Realities," Jane's Intelligence Review," V. 4, 
No 10, p.451, October 1992. 
84 Wyllie, J., "Turkey-Renationalizing Foreign Policy," Jane's Intelligence Review, V. 7, No 2, 
pp. 74-75, February 1995. 
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preoccupied by considerations emanating from their global political, military, economic, 
and ideological objectives and responsibilities, found themselves contesting for control 
and influence over Cyprus and the region. The US attitude reflected the containment 
doctrine that was the driving force behind American foreign policy since WWII. As a 
Cold War protagonist, the USA intervened to prevent expansion of Soviet influence and 
protect vital western security interests in the region. The main American aim was to bring 
Cyprus under Western Control and protect the unity of NATO by preventing a Greek-
Turkish war. The Soviet Union, thinking and acting along similar lines, intervened to 
counteract American policy and goals, and benefit from the conflict that involved 
American allies. The undermining of Western strategic interests through NATO 
disruption and the maintenance of an independent Cyprus were Moscow's basic 
goals. 85Britain, in the end, has serious responsibilities about the maintaining of the 
conflict since its plans for the settlement of the Cyprus dispute favored and enhanced the 
separation of the two communities. 86 However the main point is that during the Cold 
War, as well as throughout history, Cyprus has been strategically important because of its 
location at the ~rossroads of three continents and the major routes connecting the West 
with the East. Because of its proximity with the region, Cyprus can serve as a base of 
support for large-scale land, sea and air operations in the Middle East. The British bases 
85Joseph, S., p.72. 
86 Some of Britain's efforts promoted partition of the island. Lord Radcliffs plan in 1956 as well 
as Macmillan's two plans in 1958 encouraged external interference in the internal affairs of the island, 
opposed the creation of separate institutions for each community, and made possible the existence of 
separate goals and objectives. The more serious action was during January of 1958, when British governor 
in Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, visited Turkey to discuss conditions in Cyprus, and thus permitted Turkey to 
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should also be available to all the Western allies. It could be seen also as a secure neutral 
ground with regard to the polemics surrounding the major oil-producing region of the 
world.87 
In carrying out their policies, the two world forces took initiatives of their own or 
attempted to use local and regional proxies directly involved in the conflict. Despite some 
fluctuations in their attitudes and relations towards these proxies, Washington and 
Moscow remained attached to the promotion of strategic and ideological goals. 
Intervention by coercive diplomacy, threat and military aid were the major means of their 
attitudes. The USA turned to its junior allies, Greece and Turkey, and sought to resolve 
the conflict through means of diplomacy. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, to which 
it provided support through diplomacy and military aid. Superpower involvement in 
Cyprus was manifested during periods of crises. The threat of escalation of the conflict 
was especially alarming for the USA, while the Soviet Union expressed concern over the 
possibilities of a Western settlement of the problem by diplomacy or by force. The 
resolution of repeated crises could be largely attributed to superpower intervention in the 
form of mediation or balancing confrontation. It should be also noticed that the resolution 
of crises was not the result of superpower co-operation, rather it was largely the product 
of American intervention aimed at the containment of the conflict. Instead a parallelism 
can also be made here with the balancing effect of superpower confrontation at the global 
enter to the "Strategic game," for first time since island's independence. Hitchens, pp 51-60, and Kaloudis, 
G.,ppS-6. 
87 Adams, T., and Cottrell, J.A., Cyprus Between East and West, Studies in International Affairs, 
No7, Johns Hopkins University Press, p.56, 1968. 
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level that sustained equilibrium and a relative order in a bipolar world system during the 
Cold War. The basic assumption is that despite some adjustments in superpower attitudes 
dictated by the complexity of conflicting local, regional, ethnic, strategic and ideological 
interests involved in Cyprus, both the USA and the Soviet Union steadily pursued tactics 
and goals reflecting to their global rivalry and the bipolar international world system. 88 
The year 1974 was a determinant for the US policy. US association with the 
multiple crises -coup against the president of Cyprus, Turkish invasion, Cypriot refugee 
problem, fall of Greek junta- compounded the policy dilemmas, drawing the USA deeply 
into the region. The aftermath ofthe 1974 crisis led to an unprecedented intensification of 
American efforts toward Cyprus and the active involvement of the Congress in policy 
formulation.89 Since 1979, Cyprus has returned to an earlier phase of low-moderate 
importance for the American foreign policy. Since that time, the US supports generally 
UN mediation efforts. Additionally, the US has sometimes undertaken independent 
initiatives such as the American-British-Canadian comprehensive plan of 1978. A 
consistent theme of all administrations until the present time was and is to ensure the 
independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of Cyprus. 
The Greek junta-sponsored coup of 197 4 was not a surprise to the Soviet Union. 
Moscow denounced the coup and demanded the restoration of democracy. To Moscow's 
dismay, during the crisis two rounds of crucial negotiations took place in Geneva, 
88 Windsor, P., "NATO and the Cyprus Crisis," Adelphi Papers, No 135, pp.l9-20,summer 
1977and Joseph, S.J., pp57-61. 
89 The US Congress adopted a direct action with the establishment of an arms embargo on Turkey 
on Feb 5, 1975, that lasted until August 1978. 
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exclusively between members of NATO and outside the scope of the Security Council, 
which was the desire of Soviet policy. However, in the UN Security Council the Soviets 
did not condemn or even mention Turkey, even after the second phase of the invasion. As 
Attalides notes: "even criticism when it came was directed vaguely towards NATO rather 
the immediate perpetrators."90 Generally, and after the end of the Cold War, Russia - as 
the successive state of the former Soviet Union- recognizes the Greek-Cypriot 
government as the legitimate government of Cyprus, the existence of two distinct 
communities in Cyprus, but it has denounced any political framework that would partition 
the island, and thereby increase the potential for the enlargement of NATO's presence 
there. In 1983, the USSR was also quick to denounce the move as contrary to UN-
Security Council Resolutions and inconsistent with the search of a settlement. 
G. THE ROLE OF UNFICYP IN THE CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT 
The UN has been involved in the Cyprus problem since the eruption of violence in 
1963. The Security Council and the General Assembly have been especially influential 
actors throughout the various phases of the problem. The mission ofthe organization was 
twofold: peacekeeping and mediation duties. UNFICYP was established on March 4, 
1964 to halt violence between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and to help 
maintain order on Cyprus. Since then his role was present to all the phases of the 
problem. Concern and involvement of the world organization have been directly directed 
90 Attalides, M., Nationalism and International Politics, p.179, StMartin's Press-New York, 
1979. An explanation is giving by Joseph: "By 1974, close political and economic ties were established 
between Moscow and Ankara, where US-Turkish relations were becoming more stained (p.147)." We note 
also the strong economic agreement in energy-related projects between the two countries in 1979. 
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towards the restoration of peace, the containment of the conflict, and the search for a 
settlement of the dispute by pacific means. With the consent of the government of 
Cyprus, the guarantor powers established a peacekeeping force. The peacekeepers secured 
a cease-fire, and established a neutral zone. In the face of escalating conflict, the three 
guarantor countries agreed to expand the UN peacekeeping role. Since that time 
peacekeepers have played key roles in enforcing a buffer zone between the territories, 
overseeing the cease-fire, providing humanitarian and police services, and assisting the 
movement of people across the line. However, UN forces have had no success in 
demobilizing the opponents or in persuading them to normalize conditions.91 
Political motives and objectives coupled with diplomatic expediency prompt the 
Greek Cypriots to request UN intervention. They used the organization's Charter (Article 
103) to strengthen their diplomatic position and to gain international support for their 
positions. Emphasis was placed to the international affects of the problem, especially to 
the threat and to the use of force by Turkey against an independent country, being a 
member of the UN. The Cypriot government used the UN institutions as instruments of 
national policy. In this regard, the UN provided a ground for diplomatic maneuvering, a 
platform for political debate, and a means for mobilizing foreign governments and world 
public opinion in support of the independence and unity of Cyprus. The presentation of 
the problem in the context of foreign interference brought into play the UN principles of 
91 Boyne, S., "Moves to Settle the Cypriot Problem," Jane's Intelligence Review, V.7, No 9, 
p.404, September 1995. UNFICYP continues to monitor a buffer zone of 180 Km. The area between the 
two lines varies in width from 7 Km to only a few meters, and makes up three per cent of the island. The 
strength of the force is now at an all-time low level of just over 1200. Austria, Argentina, and UK are the 
main contributors. Nicosia remains divided in two, the last divided city in the world after the unification of 
Berlin. 
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self-determination, equal sovereignty of states, and non-intervention. As a result, the 
global condemnation of Turkish policies favoring external intervention, resort to force, 
and partition of Cyprus proved crucial for the Greek Cypriots in the after of 1974 period. 
With the UN involvement, and the use of UN forums and principles, the Greek Cypriot 
government can still hope for a negotiated settlement of the problem on the basis of a 
unified federal republic with two ethnic zones.92 
As the Cypriot case has shown, the effectiveness of the UN as a guardian of 
peace, or as an instrument of national policy, is limited because of its inability to 
implement its resolutions. In detail, there are two arguments about the success or failure 
in the peacekeeping operation of UNFICYP. The first one is to question the nature, the 
functions and the tasks of operation. In the present case these were restore and maintain 
law and order, to avoid communal fighting and to restore normal conditions of life. The 
force did not accomplish its mission and moreover, the situation ended up worse that it 
was in 1964. In this point two considerations should be made: firstly, new developments 
confronted UNFICYP with problems it was not prepared to face; secondly, the failure of 
UNFICYP is more a failure of those countries engaged in the situation than one of the 
UN itself. The second or maximal approach is that of claiming that the UN did not solve 
any kind of problem confronting the two communities.93 
During the period 1964 to 1974, the force was often overwhelmed by its efforts to 
keep peace between the two Cypriot communities, and often found it difficult to maintain 
92 Jacovides,J.A., "The Cyprus problem and the UN." 
[http:/ /www.kypros.org/UN/jacov.htrn]. September 1999. 
93Joseph, S.J, pp.ll2-114. 
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impartiality at the sides, while these parties improved opposed positions over its mission. 
But the force has increasingly suffered from serious funding difficulties, and had reached 
the point of collapse in the 1990s. In 1993, following then UN Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali's financial reassessment, UNFICYP was drastically reduced in size by 44 
per cent, and the Greek Cypriot and Greek governments decided to contribute one third of 
the force's costs. Even so, with the total cost of supporting UNFICYP now approximately 
US $50 million per year and voluntary contributions to the special account for UNFICYP, 
there is a deficit currently in excess of US $200 million. The incidents also at the 'Green 
Line' in 1996 found the force seriously overburdened. Additionally one must not ignore 
the fact that the continuation of the post 1974 status quo was more comfortable with the 
presence of the UNFICYP and its relative success in preventing incidents across the 
Green Line. UNFICYP has been always an important element of the status quo on the 
island. 
An assumption is that final success must be measured according to the political 
will of all parties concerned, to solve the problems and to reach a durable solution. The 
UN role, in this regard, is to provide for the minimum requirements for the political 
discussions to start (the continual resolutions of the organization). But at present we must 
not ignore the offer of UN. One should not overlook the fact that the organization can 
play a role in the process of world politics as a dispenser of collective political and moral 
approval of the policies and actions of states.94 Finally, UNFICYP could help enough 
with the creation of peace building activities. They increase mutual understanding, 
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provide opportunities for meaningful dialogue, involve co-operative ventures that 
increase mutual confidence, and build constructive, trusting relationships over the long 
term. A number of peace building activities have occurred during the history of the 
Cyprus conflict, but these events have generally not been well documented or publicized. 
They had little impact on the overall relationship between the two Cypriot communities. 
94 Lund, S.M, pp.195-201, and James, A., "The UN Force in Cyprus," International Affairs, V.65, 
No 3, pp.481-500. 
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IV. THE AFTER 1974 MEDIATION EFFORTS OF CYPRUS 
PROBLEM 
A. UN AS A MEDIATOR OF CYPRUS REGIONAL CONFLICT 
The second mission of the UN to the Cyprus issue refers to the mediation process. 
Since 1974, there have been numerous efforts to reach a negotiated settlement, but 
without serious result. In this period we remark a great a positive and constructive attitude 
of the Greek Cypriot side about an arrangement of the problem, and to this direction they 
made serious concessions.95 All through these years, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots 
have systematically undermined the initiatives of the U.N. Secretary General, leading 
them to an impasse Turkey's alleged support for a bicommunal - bizonal federation has 
proved to be completely insincere.96 The statements made at intervals by the Turkish and 
Turkish Cypriot leaders, as well as the official positions adopted by the latter during the 
intercommunal dialogue, show that the Turkish side merely wishes to achieve recognition 
of the pseudo-state it has set up in the north. In exchange, Turkey supports the prospect of 
achieving later, at some unspecified date, a very loose confederation of two separate 
95 The continual concessions of the Greek Cypriot party refer during the following diplomatic 
actions: Working Points 1984, Integrated Documents 1985, Draft Framework Agreement 1986, Procedural 
Formula 1987, Outline for an Overall Agreement 1988, Set ofldeas 1992, Confidence- Building Measures 
1993. Migdalovitz, C.," Cyprus: Status of UN Negotiations." [http://www. fas.org/man/crs/ 89-140.htm). 
May 1999. 
96The declarations of the Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman on 28 December 1997 make this 
quite clear: Mr. Utkan said that two states exist on Cyprus and that the only issues remaining to be solved 
are those of (a) compensation for property, (b) the achievement of mutually satisfactory security guarantees 
and (c) the drawing of a defmitive border, after minor adjustments. In this way, Turkey will have achieved 
its long-standing aim of consolidating the status quo. A second declaration about this matter from Turkish 
Prime Minister Mr. Yilmaz also said in November 1997, Turkey's vital interests are not vested only in the 
Turkish Cypriot community but in Cyprus as a whole. Source: Cyprus News, 29 December 1997. 
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states.97 Ever since the beginning of the intercommunal dialogue, whenever the Secretary 
General submitted any concrete proposals leading to a bicommunal - bizonal federation, 
the Turkish side rejected them or obstructed any progress, even when the proposals 
included provisions, which were difficult for the Greek Cypriot side to accept.98 Every 
January seems to herald the birth of yet another "Year of Cyprus Settlement." 
After 26 years of stagnation and de facto partition, a tendency has been developed 
to recognize practically for negotiating reasons two separate politico-territorial entities on 
the island. To a large extent this is an implicit assumption of the UN-led mediation for a 
"federated state", which began soon after 1974. In 1989 the UN Secretary General as the 
basis for advanced negotiations put a "Set of Ideas" forward. The ideas were subsequently 
reformulated and endorsed by SCR 774 (1992) in August 1992. For the purposes of the 
ensuing discussions, these proposals were provisionally accepted by the Greek Cypriots 
but were rejected by the Turkish Cypriots.99 However, the semantics of federalism, or 
97 James Wolfe: "The United Nations and the Cyprus Question," in Salem, Nonna: "Cyprus a 
Regional Conflict and its Resolution," Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa: St 
Martin's Press, 1989 pp. 227-241, and Joseph, S.J., pp.94-112. 
98 The Secretary General in his report dated 14.11.92, pointed out that "the positions of the 
Turkish Cypriot side are, in a fundamental way, outside the framework of the Set of Ideas", while the 
Security Council in its Resolution 789/92 expressly attributed the responsibility for the failure to the 
Turkish Cypriot side and called upon it to revise its position. Another report on May 30 1994 referred to the 
lack of political will of the Turkish Cypriot side for the achievement of any solution as a "well-known 
scenario". Kyle, pp.26-29. 
99 The "Set of Ideas" foresaw a federal Republic with a single international personality and a 
single citizenship. There would be political equality and sovereignty and a single citizenship. There would 
be political equality exercised through the effective participation of both communities in government and 
administration- though without numerical equality. The federated states would have equal powers and 
functions and there would be safeguards to prevent the federal government from impinging on them. The 
federal government would control foreign affairs, defense, federal judicial and police matters, central 
banking, customs and immigration, posts and telecommunications, patent and trademarks, health and 
environmental standards, and protection of natural resources. The states would have responsibilities in all 
other matters: education, religion, cultural affairs, local security and justice. The federal executive would 
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rather the functional practicalities of recognizing a border, where that border lies, and 
who can cross it, remain fiercely contested to this day. Apart from two significant 
intercommunal high-level agreements in the immediate post -partition period, the UN-
sponsored search for a solution has been plagued by failure. I oo The Secretary General and 
the Security Council noted the Turkish Cypriot negative attitude. 
In recent time, the intercommunal dialogue was again launched under the 
auspices of the UN, in the summer of 1997. Two meetings took place, in Troutbeck and 
Glion, at this period. A further meeting held on the 26th of September 1997 to discuss 
security issues failed because of the Turkish Cypriot refusal to discuss a new proposal for 
the gradual disarmament and demilitarization of the island as a means of reducing the 
dangers of destabilization and thus leading to the improvement of the general climate. 
President Clerides has called on Turkey to discuss how to implement this measure but, 
consist of a President and a Vice-President elected from different communities, each with a right of veto. 
The Council of Ministers would composed 70% Greek Cypriots and 30% Turkish Cypriots. The same 
analogy would be with the federal legislature in the lower level and from an equal percentage 50% in the 
upper level. Matters of importance, such as foreign affairs, defense and the budget, would require majority 
voting among the representatives of each community. The constitution could not be amended without the 
agreement of both sides. In the end, Mr. Ghali prepared a non-map that would have reduced the northern 
territory to just over 28% of the island, returning to Greek- Cypriots the Varosha district of the eastern port 
of Ammohostos, the north-western citrus-growing area of Morphou, and 34 other villages. McDonald, R., " 
Cyprus: A Peacekeeping Paradigm," The World Today, Royal Institute of International Affairs, V. 49, No. 
10, pp.182-184, October 1993 (See Appendix A). 
100 They are the 1977 Makarios-Denktash Meeting and the Kyprianou-Denktash Communique. In 
1977 they agreed: (1) Cyprus will be an independent, nonaligned, bicommunal federal republic; (2) territory 
under control of each administration will be addressed in light of economic viability, productivity, and 
property rights; (3) principles such as freedom of movement, settlement, and property will be discussed; and 
( 4) powers and functions of the central federal government would safeguard the unity of the country. In 
1979 they agreed to the same basis and address territorial and constitutional issues, giving priority to 
Varosha; to abstain from actions that might jeopardize the talks, accept the principle of demilitarization, and 
eschew union in whole or part with any other country. 
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unfortunately, Turkey has not accepted so far.lOl The resumption of the Intercommunal 
Dialogue in 1998 has so far proved impossible, because Mr. Denktash, with the full 
support of Ankara, has put foxward preconditions, which cannot be accepted and have 
been rejected by the international community.102These are the recognition of the 
pseudostate in the area occupied by Turkish troops, the freezing of negotiations for the 
adhesion of Cyprus to the EU, and an end to the so-called embargo on exports from the 
areas occupied by Turkish troops. In June of 1999, the G-7 and Russia urged Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot leaders to hold new peace talks in late 1999, saying that neither side 
should set any preconditions.l 03 Finally the new effort of UN mediation is continuing 
with the intervention of USA. The first circle of negotiations began on December 1999 of 
the past year and the new circle will begin in May 2000.104 
B. THE ROLE OF NATO 
The outbreak of inter-communal violence on Cyprus in 1963 marked 'the 
beginning of a disintegrating process of the· southeastern flank of NATO, which 
IOI A Greek- Cypriot proposal on June I9 of I998, addressed a letter to UNSG on disarmament 
based on UNSC Resolution II46/97 Para 7, which has been once more confirmed by Para 6 of UNSC 
Resolution II78/29.6.98. The international community has welcomed this courageous proposal. 
I 02 The latest UN Security Council Resolution ( 1179/98), which reaffirms the validity of all 
previous UN Security Council Resolutions. We refer also that the US Presidential envoy for Cyprus Mr. 
Holbrooke, put the blame for the failure of his mission to Cyprus in early May I998 on the preconditions 
put forward by the Turkish side. 
103 Boyne, S., " Cyprus: Divisions are Deep 25 Years on," Jane's Intelligence Review, V. II, No 
12, p.I6, December 1999. Denktas in his interview with the same author declared: "Inter-State talks, I am 
ready to continue, and all we can talk about is a confederation between two states, an agreement on how to 
co-operate. Other wise it is no use. That is where we are now." 
104 Crossette, B., "Greek and Turkish Cypriots Agree to Reunification Talks," New York Times, 
15Nov 1999. 
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culminated in the Greek withdrawal from the alliance's integrated military structure in 
1974. Greece and Turkey, acting under ethnic constraints and in support of conflicting 
conceptions of their national interests, intervened in Cyprus to support their respective 
ethnic groups. The two countries demonstrated attachment to ethnic commitments and 
insensitivity to commitments deriving from their membership in NATO. Ethnic factors 
rather than NATO bonds and principles proved to be determinants of their objectives and 
attitudes. The confrontation of the two countries over Cyprus was pursued in both the 
political and military areas and repeatedly brought the two countries to the brink of war. 
The two leading countries with major interests in the region -USA and Britain- tried to 
bring NATO into the conflict as an instrument of peacekeeping and mediation. lOS 
The failure of NATO initiatives on Cyprus did not come as a surprise for three 
additional reasons. First, no other ally, except the UK and the US showed any enthusiasm 
about becoming involved in a conflict that they considered a British post-colonial 
problem. Second, the conflict was politicized in the broader context of East West 
antagonism, and the Soviet Union resisted an intervention by the Western alliance. Third, 
the Greek side, fearing a favorable treatment of Turkey, was hesitant to endorse NATO 
offers for peacemaking operations. So the strategy of the organization aimed to establish 
Western control over Cyprus and to eliminate the danger of escalation because of the 
Greek-Turkish friction over the island. However, the attempt of NATO's intervention 
showed that the alliance could not play a constructive role in containing or resolving the 
105 Windsor, P., "NATO and the Cyprus Crisis," Adelphi Papers, The Institute for Strategic 
Studies, No 14, pp.3-16, November 1964. 
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problem of the island. It is also a fact that the significance of the NATO dimension in 
Greek-Turkish relations was probably no greater than during the events in Cyprus in the 
1960s and the 1970s, when the USA, the USSR and the UK were inextricably involved 
with the neighbors' diplomatic relations. The Cold War confrontations continued until 
1989 and to some extent persist in Russia's repeated calls for an international conference 
on the conflict, its informal links with Cyprus as an outlet for Russian economic interests, 
and more recently, with its arms sales (tanks and missiles), which Turkey interprets as an 
attempt to get a Russian foothold in the Mediterranean. In addition, with the geostrategic 
developments in Central Asia, the USA and the UK are reticent to alienate Turkey, 
possessing the second largest armed force in NATO, and occupying an important 
geographic position. Turkey has exploited this fact in order to promote its interests and to 
promote its western orientation.! 06 
It was the conflicting visions of a future Cyprus that led to Greece's refusal to take 
part in a NATO manoeuvre with Turkey in 1955. The Greeks' absence from NATO's 
integrated military structure from 1974 to 1980 further demonstrated both their belief in 
the Cyprus cause, and later, Turkey's belief that its own security concerns in the Aegean 
deserved further consideration. In the recent years, awkward relations between Greece 
and Turkey within NATO have continued, affecting Aegean exercises, infrastructure 
funding and troop assignments.! 07 
106 Joseph, S. J., pp.79-92. 
107 McDonald, R., "Greece: The Search for a Balance," "The World Today, Royal Institute of 
international Affairs, V.44, No. 6, pp.100-103, June 1988 and Danopoulos, C., "Regional Security 
Organizations and National Interests: Analyzing the NATO-Greek Relationship," Journal of Political and 
Military Sociology, V. 16, pp.264-275, fal11988. 
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The membership of both countries in NATO has decreased chances of war, but 
the ongoing Greek-Turkish disputes have brought the alliance itself into serious harm. 
The disputes have already affected the planning and operation ofNATO's engagement in 
Bosnia. A lot of projects are blocked and the implementation ofthe full-integrated NATO 
principal subordinate command structure had been delayed for years. Finally, following 
the endorsement of NATO's new command structure at the Washington summit, 1999, 
with the parallel reorganization of NATO joint Sub-Regional Headquarters in Izmir and 
Larissa, the situation has changed in a smoothed way. One can also refer that the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact removed a common threat, 
leaving the two countries relatively free to pursue their national objectives. In addition, 
internal political situations have led the two countries to use the disputes for domestic 
political advantage, and have made the two governments less flexible. 
C. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 
Cyprus is at the threshold of the EU and preparing to become a full member in the 
new century. The EU, which has repeatedly expressed its concern over the lack of a 
settlement on the island, is now in a unique position to play a role in bringing about 
permanent peace and stability on the Mediterranean island and in the region. The EU has 
taken a clear and firm position on the question of Cyprus and the EU has always 
considered unacceptable the status quo created by the Turkish invasion of 197 4. The EU 
can greatly influence the Cyprus issue since the parties involved are either part of, or have 
special relations with, the EU and can appreciate and support a European Union initiative 
on Cyprus. Greece is a member of the EU, and Turkey is engaged through a customs 
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union. The Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots are faced with a unique challenge 
and an opportunity to resolve their differences, reunite their island, and become part of 
the European integration process that will offer them the security and stability they have 
been longing for. In this effort the institutions, legal order, principles and policies of the 
EU can provide a conductive framework in the search for a stable political settlement in 
Cyprus. 
By the time an agreement to proceed with a Cyprus-EU customs union by 2002, 
had been struck in May 1987, Turkey had formally applied to become a full member. lOS 
For Turkey also the EU had become a main political target. The Customs Union 
Agreement between Turkey and the EU was finally agreed upon in March 1995, but with 
key Turkish concessions. These included the eligibility of Cyprus for EU membership 
being reiterated, with the EU to consider Cyprus in the forthcoming round of 
enlargement. The Greek Cypriots and Greece naturally view the EU accession as a 
significant tool for levering apart the increasingly united defense of Turkey and the 
Turkish Cypriots. The crucial question, however, is whether early accession to the EU 
could act as a catalyst for an internal political settlement between the two communities on 
the island or whether the internal settlement should be considered as a pre-condition for 
accession. Generally, the EU-Cyprus accession negotiations came across to Turkish 
108 Turkey's main considerations about EU are the following: (1) a belated desire to respond to 
the challenge of Greek entry into the EU; (2) a feeling that EU membership is a natural continuation of a 
process, after the Turkey's entry to NATO and to the Council of Europe; (3) a desire among Turkish 
industrialists to gain access to European markets; ( 4) a somewhat vague hope in some circles that the EU 
could be a second solution for Turkey's internal cultural and political conflicts and safeguard the country 
against a takeover by Islamic fundamentalism or another military coup. Islam fundamentalists are the main 
opposing group of the EU. See Barchard, D., " Turkey's Troubled Prospect," The World Today, Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, V. 46, No.6, p.107, June 1990. 
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Cypriot side as an unacceptable pressure tactic, an arrogation by Cypriot Greeks of 
decision-making authority over the Turkish Cypriot community, and a defacto merging of 
Greece and official Cyprus' government within the framework of the EU to the exclusion 
of Turks.! 09 Then, the EU question is not purely political. In Cyprus, the economic 
asymmetry on either side of the UNBZ heralds a problematic integration of the north with 
both the south and the EU in general, and although the EU and the USA are most often 
quoted, it is not yet possible to predict who will fund the necessary restructuring. Though 
small, the economy in northern Cyprus is fragile and largely Turkish-funded, unsupported 
as it is from international sources. II O 
Cypriot Communities GDP GDP-Real GDP-Per. Population 
(Bill.$) Growth Capita($) (thousands) 
rate (0/o) 
Greek Cypriots 9,75 2,5 15,000 645 
(Cyprus Republic) 
Turkish Cypriots 1,44 1,44 8,000 200 
(TRNC) 
Table 2. Indicators ofRepublic of Cyprus and TRNC, Source: Republic of 
Cyprus, Ministry of Finance, Dep. of Statistics and Research, 1997. 
In July 1994 the European Court of Justice effectively banned TRNC-produced 
exports of citrus fruit and potatoes to the EU, as they had to be certified by the "Republic 
of Cyprus", and the TRNC government reacted very strongly. Since then Denktas' 
109 Wilkinson, M.J. "Moving Beyond Conflict Prevention to Reconciliation. Tackling Greek-
Turkish Hostility," A report to Carnegie Corporation of New York. Preventing Deadly Conflict, pp10-24, 
June 1999. 
110 Boyne observes that the Turkish Cypriots would prefer an agreed federal solution before 
Cyprus accedes to the EU, and they are also adamant that Cyprus should not join without Turkey also 
becoming a member. There would be many advantages for the TRNC in forging a settlement with the south 
to form a unified, federal republic within the EU. Boyne, S., " Moves to Settle the Cypriot Problem," Jane's 
Intelligence Review, V.7, No 9, p.406, Sep 1995. 
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relationship with the EU has all but ended; indeed, further integration between the EU 
with Turkey, both economic and political, has proven more attractive. In July 1997 the 
EU took note of Turkey's eligibility and confirmed that Turkey will be judged by the 
same objective criteria as other applying countries. There were also recommendations-
for example that Turkey should give a firm commitment to resolve its regional problems 
and the Cypriot issue. In addition, the veto of Greece threatened to complicate the 
situation yet further. Greece would block the entire EU enlargement process if Cyprus 
were in any way treated "unfairly", and has repeatedly sought to link the Cyprus issue 
with the establishment of the EU customs union with Turkey (accordingly blocking an 
ECU 600 million financial protocol with Turkey). As a proof, Greece was a key force in 
the European Union's decision in December 1997 not to consider Turkey's application 
for membership. Greece has also blocked the release of funds for Turkey. During the 
Cardiff summit (June 1998) and the Vienna summit (December 1998) Greece followed 
the same policy. III But, during the Helsinki summit (December 1999) Greece withdrew 
its veto. It was result of two factors: first political pressure from USA and European 
powers on Greece, and a new policy that hopes to enforce the Turkey to contribute 
according the western norms. It will also facilitate the entrance of Cyprus as a full-
member in the EU.ll2 The final point is that within the Cyprus-EU accession, the EU is 
Ill Riemer, A.," Turkey and the EU. A Never Ending Story." 
[http:// www.Columbia.edulsec/dlc/ciao/isa/riaOll]. August 1999. 
112 Zaman notes for this point: "Ignoring Turkish objections, the EU has started accession talks 
with the Greek Cypriot administration, recognized by the rest of the world as the legitimate government of 
Cyprus. In what has been viewed as a major concession to Greece, EU leaders used deliberately vague 
language that appeared to leave the door open to full membership for Cyprus in the absence of any 
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l 
bringing extra power and hope for conflict resolution and a final settlement of the 
problem. 1 13 
President Clinton, during an official visit in Turkey on 16 November 1999, 
addressing the Turkish parliament, leavened his comments by acknowledging hat Turkey 
has made some progress in improving its human rights record though there is a need of 
enlarging effort in the future, and he stressed his support for the country's application to 
join the EU. The 15-nation EU, which has opposed Turkey's application publically for 
most because of its poor support of human rights, finally accepted Turkey with a 
candidate membership status at the Helsinki summit in December 1999. At Clinton's 
urging, the island's Greek and Turkish leaders agreed on 14 November 1999 to resume 
UN-sponsored negotiations in New York beginning December. 114 
settlement with the Turkish Cypriots." Zaman, A.," Turkey Pledges To Meet EU Tenns," Washington Post, 
29 Jan. 2000. 
113 In that direction the European Court of Human Rights took a very important decision in the 
case Loizidou v. Turkey. The case originated in an application by Loizidou, a Greek Cypriot woman who 
owned property in Northern Cyprus and she supported that Turkish troops had prevented her from returning 
to her land, where she had planned to build flats, including one as a home for her family. The court 
condemned Turkey for this continuing violation and its attribution to the human rights. This decision 
confirmed the illegality of Turkish invasion. Rudolf, B. "International Decisions, Loizidou v. Turkey" 
American Journal of International Law, 18 Apr.2000. 
114 Babington, C., "Cypriot Leaders Agree to Talks," Washington Post, 14 November 1999 and 
"Improve Rights record, Clinton Urges Turkey," Washington Post, 16 November 1999. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT 
A. WEAKNESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION 
The early negotiations and mediations by the Secretary General in the 1960s and 
the early 1970s were more voluntary. It was the time of the early stages of the conflict, 
and the external parties were already involved. The Turkish Cypriots were more willing 
to negotiate, because they thought they were the losing party and they were trying to gain 
benefits. This pre-1974 phase of negotiations, conducted under the auspices of the UN 
Secretary-General, centered on giving up certain Turkish Cypriot rights and separatist 
provisions entrenched in the 1960 constitution, in exchange for Turkish Cypriot local 
autonomy. The 1974 invasion created a new situation. Before 1974 the intercommunal 
talks were focused on a unitary state with local autonomy for Turkish Cypriots, whereas 
after 1974, they have focused on a federal solution, but with different interpretation by 
each side. A series of high-level negotiations has taken place in the decade of 70s with 
proposal for an independent bicommunal federal republic. After that, subsequent 
negotiations, although proclaiming adherence to the proceeding two high-level 
agreements. Greek Cypriots envisioned a unitary federal state with a strong central 
government and no internal borders, and they fully support the three fundamental 
freedoms of movement, settlement, and ownership of property. Turkish Cypriots 
envisioned a decentralized or weak federation or confederation with clear territorial 
boundaries for security reasons, and provisions for gradual progress to a customs union. 
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In the end, the willingness for the negotiations of the Turkish Cypriots has decreased 
since the late 1980s and early 1990s because they were interested first of all to improve 
international relations for the new "TRNC." So the mediation processes of the UN were 
no more voluntary in this period. The UN started to put more pressure on both sides in 
order to coerce them to give up their unwillingness to negotiate a solution. IIS 
Past negotiations have been highly formal, legalistic, rigid and narrow in agenda 
of matters. The emphasis has been placed on procedural matters and publicity rituals. 
Thus, in almost every mediation/ negotiation on the Cyprus Conflict, there has been a 
debate on the title of the leaders of the two communities.II6 However, a solution was 
always negotiated and each party entered into the mediation/ negotiation as "the leader" 
of his community. But this debate has always created a tense situation in the parties 
before the beginning of the works. Besides that, each party has certain positions that they 
don't want to talk about. For example, the Turkish Cypriot side states that they would 
never accept an agreement that would not provide Turkey with the "right of unilateral 
intervention," according to the 1960 Agreement Treaty and the Greek Cypriot side wants 
to have a guarantee agreement which will eliminate Turkey's unilateral right as a 
115Migdalovitz, N., pp.3-15. 
116 A characteristic example is in the sponsored talks of October 26, 1992, that were doomed 
from the beginning because Turkish Cypriot leader refused to show at his scheduled meetings with the 
Secretary General and the Greek Cypriot leader in protest for not being addressed as President. Before any 
negotiation initiative the Turkish Cypriot leader demands" Substantial Equality," and first of recognition of 
his pseudostate. 
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guarantor state to intervene into the problems of the island. For the Greek Cypriot 
community the guarantees should be international and multilaterai.II7 
The method of Fisher and Ury "Getting to Yes" as it was improved in the Chapter 
II of this thesis points out with clarity the stalemate in the Cyprus mediation. The 
involvement of various mediators has illustrated that each international mediator has been 
able to do little more than strengthen the local and emerging status quo, which reflects the 
common BATNA of the two Cypriot communities according to the same method of 
· analysis. First it was an effort "to separate the people from the problem." This has failed 
to happen to the Cyprus issue. Usually the parties in this issue find the best way to avoid 
compromises by resorting to blaming the other party for the failure of establishing a 
consensus. Leaders of different parties with declarations to the press to public places 
created a hostile environment. The mediator, usually the Secretary General, also 
attributed the failure of the negotiations to the position of a leader party or both parties to 
the Security Council. And sometimes this gave a good tool for the negotiators to blame 
the Secretary General to cover up their own behaviors in front of their people. liS Another 
point is that the two communities have opted frameworks with bases on international 
117 Richmond, P.O., Mediating in Cyprus, pp.232-239. 
118 A study about this matter supports that there is strong interaction between domestic political 
structures, domestic political conditions, and international political conditions at the time of the mediation. 
It affects also the willingness of parties to take advantage of opportunities for gains through the mediation 
process. Very often there is also influence of the domestic political situation of the opponent party. Leeds 
A.B., and Davis R.D., "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, V.41, No6, pp.827-833, December 1977. Besides this fact, the leader of Turkish Cypriot side 
used the new cycle of mediation process that begins on May 23 as an advantage for the second round of 
presidential elections to his party and he declared: "The people placed their trust in me again. I'll be 
stronger to fight for (Turkish Cypriot) cause on May 23 new talks." From Tribune News Service, "Second 
Round Needed in Presidency Vote," Chicago Tribune, 16 April2000. 
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norms that appear legitimate and rational but if there will be interaction between them the 
result will be a mutual catastrophe. Second, the effort of "focusing only on interests not in 
positions," was also a failure. It lies here to the fact that during the last three decades, 
many interests of the parties were not the same at any time. It is one of the most important 
factors of the conflict that none of the parties want to acknowledge. For example, the 
Greek Cypriot leadership has moved from a pursuit of union with Greece in the 1950s, to 
the unified state-federal state in the 1990s. The Turkish Cypriots have modified their 
position from local autonomy within a unitary state in the 1960s to a bizonal federation in 
the late 1970s, to a loose confederation with demands for a right of secession even after 
an agreed federal solution in more recent years.Il9 It is also a consequence of the devious 
objectives of the disputants related to the rewards they attempted to gain from the third 
party. The mediators preferred to consolidate the explosive in many historical times 
situations. It may be preferable to any alternative in order to avoid the clash of state 
sovereignty, basic element of the international system.I20 Third, it was the effort "of 
inventing options for mutual gain." This has not really happened, either. Since 1963, and 
especially since 1974, the dispute's parties presented many options. For example, a 
"federal republic" was introduced into the conflict and, on paper; all parties accepted that 
as the basis for a future federal "Republic of Cyprus" (1977 and 1979 summits). But, each 
community has different interpretations of the type of a Federal Cyprus Republic. And the 
119 Truesdell, A., "Nicosia Raises the stakes on Cyprus," Jane's Intelligence Review, V. 9, No 4, 
p.167, April1997. 
120 Thomas M. Frank and George Nolte, "The Good Offices Function of the Secretary General," 
in Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, UN: Divided World, pp 179-180, Oxford University Press, 1996. 
76 
fourth part of the method, which also failed, was "the insistence on using objective 
criteria." Until the 1990s, when the pressure of the UN increased on both sides to sit for 
the negotiation, due to the above reasons, most of the time none of the sides had come up 
with objective criteria for a detailed solution. Basically, both sides played a "reactionary" 
policy: instead of providing detailed objective criteria, they only reacted to the former 
policy of the other side. This is because the two communities have always regarded 
themselves as separate. It was a characteristic oddity of behavior in a game where the 
Greek/ Greek Cypriot alliance use to abuse continually the Turkish Cypriot side and the 
Turkish/ Turkish Cypriot alliance makes the same thing with the Greek Cypriot side. The 
motherlands always influenced. Their related communities with irredentist theories and 
provide political, cultural, military and economical support.121 
One must also emphasize some other serious assumptions of these negotiations. 
There has been a perceived power imbalance between the two communities. Turkish 
Cypriots claim that the recognition of the Greek Cypriot side as the only legal 
government of the isle, give it the chance of making "one sided propaganda." According 
to the Greek Cypriots, the presence of Turkish troops in the Northern Cyprus makes the 
Turkish Cypriot position stronger on the table. Another assumption is thatsometimes one 
side threatens the other side by saying that they will not participate to the following 
negotiations, if the other side does not act in a certain way. Such behavior creates tension. 
However, the parties usually attended to most of the mediations to which the UN invited 
them. That was not because they wanted to attend to the mediation (more for the Turkish 
121 Richmond, P.O., Mediating in Cyprus, pp.168-171 and 215-219. 
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Cypriot side), but rather because they felt obliged/pressured by the UN, or they did not 
want to confront the consequences- for example, sanctions or embargoes- for their 
unwillingness. However, the parties showed their unwillingness during the process, by 
rejecting every idea of the other side; by postponing an answer; or by using special tricks 
to avoid deciding. From all the above remarks one can conclude that a healthy 
environment that is necessary for smooth and effective negotiations was always absent 
from the Cyprus diplomatic table.I22 
Two important issues have tremendous impact on the overall failure of the 
previous attempts to solve the Cyprus conflict: Lack of trust and the growing gap between 
the two communities. In an optimistic aspect, these two issues are the requisites of the 
successful mediation/ negotiation processes that will open the way for a detailed, fair 
solution, a solution that will be acceptable to both sides and more importantly a solution 
that will be worked out by the two communities without foreign imposition. Both 
communities lived together a long time under British domination. After the events in the 
1960s and 1970s, old and new generations of Cypriots of the two communities have been 
fed with hate, anger, and distrust for 30 years. Turkish Cypriots see the Turkish army as 
the guarantee of their safety. Greek Cypriots see the same matter as a threat. They have 
being continuing to arm themselves by spending $300 million on the new military 
equipment per year. The debate is continuing with Turkish Cypriots who claim that the 
Greek Cypriots are not buying arms for the defense objectives but for their future 
offensive purposes. That is the psychological state of mind of the leaders who sit for 
122 Hampson, F.O., Nurturing Peace, pp.35-53, United States Institute ofPeace Press, 1996. 
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mediation I negotiation whether it is the reality or a deliberately created vision. The 
leaders also, since they are politicians, transmit the masses with these visions, or 
appealing the national emotions in order to support their intensions. The fact that the two 
Cypriot communities don't have political,· social or even economical contact facilitates 
the easy manipulation of the people by the political elite of each party. Thus, ethno-
nationalist rhetoric is perceived as being the safest option in terms of security, both for 
the island and for its political readers; but this ironically results in an increase of 
insecurity.I23 As it was also referred in the previous II Chapter as an assumption, Brown's 
four main factors that create internal conflict and are all present to the Cyprus issue: 
discriminatory political institutions as a product of the 1960 constitutional arrangement, 
exclusionary national ideologies, intergroup separate politics and elite politics. 
B. CAUSES AND·OBSTACLES TO A SETTLEMENT 
A primary cause for the stalemate of the Cyprus problem is that the parties 
involved have so far seen the conflict through adversarial options, focusing on positions 
that would maximize their gains regardless of the impact on others. The lack also of a 
shared definition' of the problem has damaged the will and confidence to negotiate and to 
make concessions. The Greek Cypriots present the problem as one of foreign invasion 
and occupation, and of violation of international law and human rights since 197 4. The 
Turkish Cypriots see the problem as one of neglect, domination, and oppression of the 
minority as a result of the Greek Cypriot leadership from 1963 to 1974. Thus, their 
123 Richmond, P.Oliver, "Ethno-Nationalism in Cyprus", Middle Eastern Studies, V.35, No.3, pp. 
41-52, July 1999. 
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political positions are antagonistic. Underlying interests and needs were often 
subordinated to staking out a given position. So, the needs for security, recognition, 
identity, equality, justice, dignity, and the three basic freedoms were addressed only in a 
political and legalistic context, with each side expecting the other to make compromises 
and concessions unilaterally. No prospect of integration could be since each party worked 
to fulfill its own needs while at the same time undermining those of the other. The 
respective positions of each party on critical issues even today appear incompatible. Such 
apparently incompatible positions include the role of the Turkish troops, international 
guarantees, the exercise of fundamental freedoms and the return of refugees. The situation 
is exacerbated by a preoccupation with receiving or denying prior recognition to each 
other_l24This is manifested in arguments over whether a future federation should succeed 
the present government of Cyprus or the two de facto autonomous regions, and by 
reluctance to promote long-discussed measures of good will and confidence building for 
fear of setting precedent and prejudging the final political outcome.125 
The changes of these positions will be bridged through the current traditional 
course of mediation process are limited, and this because they are perceived by the parties 
as conflicting and soon as arbitrary and unjustified. So, each serious solution must 
examine carefully and first of all it will be application in a test time. The only solution to 
124 Bahcheli, T, Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955, p.55, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1990, and 
Attalides, M, p.76. 
125 Such confidence-building measures are: (1) the settlement, under UN administration, of the 
city ofVarosha by its Greek Cypriot inhabitants; (2) the reopening, under UN administration, of the Nicosia 
international airport with access from both sides; (3) various military deconfrontation measures; and (4) 
special status areas adjacent to each other for the purpose of enhancing trust between the sides. 
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the problem is a third-party mediator with resources and desire to contribute drastically to 
a serious conflict settlement. 
C. CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND MEDIATION EFFECTIVENESS 
Hampson claims that there are four main schools of thought related to setting 
ethnic conflict. The first argues that ancient hatreds are so great that only the coercive 
intervention of major powers can create a stable balance of power to negate the effects of 
security dilemma through 'ethnic unmixing."126 The second argues that non-coercive 
intervention can bring the parties to a settlement through stalemate, ripe moments, 
confidence building measures, and power-sharing arrangements which should have an eye 
towards developing democracy, moderation, and liberal institutions.127 The third argues 
that just a political order needs to be established which promotes democracy and human 
rights as these are the key conditions for making peace. This calls for the promotion of 
new norms, democratic political institutions, participatory governance structures, civil 
society, international tribunals and truth commissions. Disarming, repatriating refugees, 
building a consensus for peace under the auspices of the UN, and moderate local political 
leadership play a role in this method.128 And the fourth school includes the use of conflict 
resolution workshops, which attempt to reduce stereotyping at the citizen leveJ.129 What 
is needed for the Cyprus issue is a contingency approach in which all these approaches 
126 Hampson, F.O., "Third Party Roles in the Termination of Intercommunal Conflict," 
Millennium, V. 26, No3, pp. 727-730, 1997. 
127 Idid. pp 734-735. 
128 Idid. pp.736-740. 
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are used in sustained manner with flexibility and exploitation of the experience of past 
efforts. 
The international mediation of the Cyprus problem until the present time did not 
succeed in breaking into the sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction of the Cyprus state by 
Greek Cypriots and of reducing the expectations of a separatist group like the Turkish 
Cypriots. As it was explained in Chapter II of this thesis, there is the strong argument that 
the international community should remain very reluctant to sacrifice the principle of 
territorial integrity to self-determination, and should avoid admitting unstable entities into 
statehood. In this international environment, it appears that both sides believe sovereignty 
is divisible, as illustrated by the Turkish Cypriot attempts to create a recognized separate 
state, and the Greek Cypriot acceptance of a federal state, where they have the primary 
role according to the population size. Consequently, both the option of separation into 
two states and autonomy within one state prove very serious matters, as both community 
parties can point out to a different set of international principles. Besides there is the fact 
that the past Cyprus mediation attempts did not have the benefit of a serious, interactive, 
and evolutionary process that might enable the two parties to gradually develop a new, 
shared vision and intercommunal discourse. The UN organs proved an inability to find a 
compromise that Cypriots could accept the still controversial dichotomy between 
secession and self-determination. It failed mainly to the perception of insecurity and fear 
of domination, and the fail to create the social-psychological, educational, developmental, 
129 Idid. pp .742-743. 
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and institutional infrastructure necessary for the two Cypriot communities to come 
together. 
Two new dynamic elements added to the Cyprus problem during the last decade 
oflast century: the 1996 events of the 'Green Line' and the EU issue. Thus untill996, it · 
can be seen that the protracted stalemate was viewed as an advantage to both sides, as it 
expressed the common BA TNA. Then, Greeks Cypriots felt that time would enable them 
to bring international pressure to bear on Turkey/Turkey Cypriot axis; while the Turkish 
Cypriots felt that it was a proper time of pressing for an international recognition of a new 
state. The same happened with the EU issue. The Republic of Cyprus -representing the 
Greek Cypriot side- won the right to conduct accession talks with the EU with the deep 
desire to leave the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean behind and escape the double 
minority situation. The Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey were well aware of the 
possibilities of such a move and were determined to prevent this because of the fact that 
the Turkish Cypriot side has not been included in the negotiation process. When the EU 
announced that Cyprus would be invited to commence accession talks, the situation has 
been changed, and the Turkish Cypriot side saw it as a lost of opportunity to regain the 
international legitimacy that they so desired. The entrance of the new century gave to the 
matter a new perspective with the EU organs to promote the Cyprus membership. For the 
first time, the new expansion's program does not require the mandatory settlement of the 
problem before the official acceptance of the official Cyprus state to the union. So, the 
EU, in cooperation with other factors, is in a unique position to play a serious role in 
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Cyprus' impasse.l30 Until then, the efforts of international mediation can achieve little 
until the Turkish Cypriot leadership has committed itself to adherence to international 
norms of behavior, and this itself depends on how much longer Turkey can sustain its 
unpopular position on Cyprus within the international community. 
The Republic of Cyprus -representing the Greek Cypriot side- with a 'joint 
defense dogma' in cooperation with Greece, its movement towards accession with the 
EU, and its acquisition of high-tech weaponry has greatly influenced the stakes in the 
current status quo, and illustrate the fact that without flexibility from Turkey/Turkey 
Cyprus axis, the Greek Cypriot side may be prepared to take greater risks promoting the 
issue of he settlement. The diplomatic game received a new interest with the parallel 
effort of Turkey to enter in the EU as a full-member. The withdrawing of the veto by 
Greece in December 1999 at the EU summit in Helsinki was a serious effort that first 
intends to guarantee peace, development and cooperation in the region and second to 
secure and to facilitate the entrance of Cyprus to the same Union.131 
130Dorsey comments: " Some European officials believe that the prospect of EU membership 
negotiations with Greek Cyprus as well as glaring economic disparity between the more prosperous Greek 
and economically lagging Turkish parts of the island, may serve to break down resistance in Turkey to a 
compromise resolution. Dorsey, M. J., " Mounting Communal Tensions Increase Need for Cyprus 
Settlement," Washington Report On Middle East Affairs, V.l5, No.7, p.29&91, March 1997 
131 The Prime Minister of Greece declared during the works of the summit: "The EU is a 
community of principles, values and rules assisting the common effort of overcoming nationalism and 
conflict. The EU leads to the creation of ties of friendship, it is to the benefit of Turkey, but also of Greece 
and the EU for Turkey to become part of this framework ... we believe that the development of cooperation 
is necessary, we recently undertook a series of moves and initiatives to develop our relations. But Turkey's 
participation in the process of European integration will lead to problems if there are not clear positions on 
the outstanding differences." Embassy of Greece, Press office. [http:/ greekembassy.org/press/pressreleases/ 
grguaranties.html]. Dec 1999. 
84 
A dynamic conflict resolution of the problem must follow the following steps: (1) 
Great power intervention, with a role of third party mediator with strong resources in his 
disposition, needs first to be directed primary in Greco-Turkish relations.132This will deal 
with the security dilemma between Greece and Turkey, which is primarily responsive for 
the secondary Cyprus security dilemma. This would open the relations of the two 
countries, Greece and Turkey, placing them onto a new cooperative plane, aid both states' 
relationship with the EU, and also removing more of the financially draining military 
imperatives over which their economies receive a huge surcharge.l33 The two countries 
could persuade that defense expenditures deprive the rest of the economy of the necessary 
resources to grow. Defense expenditures take an exorbitant share of national budgets in 
two countries. Moreover, both Turkey and Greece are in a serious attempt to eliminate 
their international economic debt and to succeed greater rhythm of economic 
development_l34 Greece as a full-member ofEU has mainly economic priorities, since the 
132 A comment by Kinzer confmns this fact: ·~ the latest quarrel -refers to a fact in June 1998 
where four Greek F-16 fighter jets accompanied by two military cargo planes with the Greek Minister of 
Defense inside in one of the two planes, were annoyed by Turkish F-16s to their direction forward Cyprus. 
Finally, they landed at a Cypriot airfield. It reflected the fact that although the Cypriot dispute is ostensibly 
between the Republic of Cyprus and the ethnically Turkish enclave in the north, the greater conflict is 
between their patron states, Greece and Turkey." Kinzer S., "Greece and Turkey Revive Dispute Over 
Cyprus," New York Times, 20 June 1998. 
133Botsas N Elefterios, "The U.S-Cyprus-Turkey-Greece Tetragon: The Economics of an 
Alliance," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, V. 16, No.2, pp.258-261, fall 1988. Botsas also 
notes: " Greece and Turkey derived economic benefits from the Alliance as well as from their cooperative 
spirit of the 1950s. Their perennial conflict has increased the cost to their economies. There is evidence of 
substitution of military spending for socially needed capital formation, but the perception is that they need 
the military spending for defense against one another rather than against a common enemy."p.261. 
134 Since the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey's defense expenditure as a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) has been .the highest among all NATO members and has 
remained unaffected by all variations of tension in East West relations. Greece and Turkey spend about 
2.2% of their GNP on education, less than one-half of what the rest of Europe spends, but about three times 
for Greece, and two times for Turkey, as much for defense. Last year and according to NATO sources 
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country desires strongly to participate in the Monetary Union of Europe. Turkey, as a 
candidate member to the same economic and political union, more than Greece, must 
succeed dynamic economic performances of development. As the EU has a lot of times 
declared, the entrance of Turkey into the union will deeply depend from its progress in 
two main issues: human rights, and economic development as necessary requirement for 
the country to obtain the economic criteria of the union. 135 A progress or better a 
substantial contribution of Turkey to the Cyprus settlement will greatly ameliorate the 
international profile of the country, not only in Europe, but also to all the international 
community. As Haass also illustrates the flow of trade and investment from Greece and 
Turkey to their respective zones in Cyprus is considerable. But, the flow from Turkish 
side is especially heavy. The economically weak and isolated Turkish Cypriot side 
survives as a distinct entity, mostly with Turkish economical funds. To this cost one must 
Turkey spent 5.7% and Greece 4.9%, Britain 2.6%, Germany 1.5%, France 2.8%, Spain 1.4% of their GNP 
for the defense sector. Sheehan and Moustakis also refer that Turkey have in action a 10-year US $431 
billion armament program from 1996 and Greece answered with a $14 billion program for the period 1996-
2000. Moustakis, F., and Sheehan, M., "Earthquake Heals Aegean Rift," Jane's Intelligence Review, V. 11, 
No 12, p.12, Dec 1999. 
135 The Agenda 2000 from July 1997 give an assessment of the political and economic situation. 
The commission states Turkey's eligibility and confirmed that Turkey will be judged by the same objective 
criteria as other applying countries. The same document comprises also recommendations, saying that 
Turkey should give a firm commitment to resolve its regional problems and the Cypriot issue. The agenda 
covered also the support of the democratic standards and the human rights level, and repeat the general 
support for Turkey and a reinforcement of the bilateral communication. Agenda 2000, " The Challenge of 
Enlargement," Part IV. At the same point, Fischer, German Foreign Minister, after a meeting with the leader 
of Turkish Cypriot party RaufDenktas, on 15 February 2000, supported that the procedure for a settlement 
ofthe Cyprus problem will consist a positive role for the Greek-Turkish relations and he added: "In Turkey, 
there are some positive steps about the human rights. But, there is a lot to be done. After Helsinki, the 
human rights consist integral part of the strategy of approaching Turkey." Valasopoulos, P.,"Positive 
changes," Eleutherotypia, 16 Feb. 2000. 
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also add the cost of maintaining an army of 35,000 soldiers.136 Thus, a solution of the 
Cyprus problem with the parallel substantial withdrawal of this huge military force will 
liberate enough economic funds that could ideally be used for increasing economic 
development, the second basic precondition for Turkey's successful accession to the 





POPULATION GNP PER 
(MILLION) (BIL.$) CAPITA. 
GNP$ 
63,5 379 6100 
GREECE 132 10,5 86 8200 
Table 3: Indicators ofTurkey and Greece. Sources: Washington World 
Bank, and "The State ofthe World"(Geneva, UN), 1997. 
(2) After the first step, new dynamic third party mediation, with the same power as in the 
previous attempt, is required for the island based on both Cypriot communities' 
endorsement of, and commitment to, international norms. A solution could be a bizonal 
federal state with shared sovereignty, and a really productive functioning of the State. (3) 
The new actor of international mediation to the Cyprus problem, the EU, with the 
acception of the Cyprus as a new member, would facilitate the development of a wider 
civil society, which would promote democracy and the civil rights through the promotion 
of new norms, democratic political institutions, and participatory governance structures. 
136 Haass, N. Richard, "Cyprus: Moving Beyond Solution," The Washington Quarterly, V. 10, 
N.2, p.185, spring 1987. 
137 Antonakis to this point supports: "Current conventional wisdom suggests that military 
expenditure may affect economic growth through the creation of additional aggregate demand, the whole 
host of spin-offs that result from military spending, the possible reduction of investment, and the 
displacement of talent from the most dynamic sectors of civilian production." Antonakis, N., "Guns Versus 
Butter," Journal of conflict Resolution, V.43, No 4, p. 501, August 1999. 
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In other words, the European integration process could assure the stability, the peace, the 
economic development, and the duration to the settlement of the problem.I38 ( 4) Other 
means: use of international tribunals and commissions, disarmament, repatriation at least 
of refugees that have a strong desire to return, building a consensus for peace under the 
auspices of the UN, and in the end confidence building measures. The experience also of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) could ideally be used in 
the Cyprus case. The organization aims to strengthen pluralist democracy and the 
observance of human rights, and to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes between 
its members. Through its emphasis on disarmament, confidence-building measures and 
human rights, the OSCE contributed in long-term conflict prevention in nine countries 
and is conducting seven Sanctions Assistance Missions in the countries surrounding 
Serbia I Montenegro. The OSCE cooperated also with NATO, the Council of Europe, and 
UN officials are often present at its meetings. It encompasses all the elements that can 
guide to an effective conflict resolution of the Cyprus problem: military confidence 
building, arms control, and economic, scientific, technological, environmental and 
humanitarian cooperation.I39 Thus, the OSCE could ideally cooperate or enforce the EU 
in a new mediation effort. It possesses also the advantage that it represents a forum for 
political consultation and cooperation of fifty-four member states that includes both a 
138 A relative comment of James M Dorsey: "Some European officials believe that the prospect of 
EU membership negotiations with Greek Cyprus as well as glaring economic disparity between the more 
prosperous Greek and economically lagging Turkish parts of the island, may serve to break down resistance 
in Turkey to a compromise resolution." This comment receives more significance after the 1999 acceptance 
of Turkey as a candidate member of Europe. Dorsey, M.J., "Mounting Communal Tensions Increase Need 
For Cyprus Settlements," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, V XV, No.7, p29&71, March 1997. 
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transatlantic and a Russian presence. All the above continual steps of conflict 
management can constitute a framework of a proper and effective framework of a third-
party mediation. 
D. THE EXPECTATION OF AN EFFECTIVE THIRD- PARTY MEDIATOR 
As it was also observed in Chapter II of this thesis, an effective conflict resolution 
can be the result of two basic preconditions: "Ripe moment" and "hurting stalemate." A 
lack of ripeness is a frequent explanation off why diplomacy and third-party mediation 
efforts have failed to resolve the problem. The previous analysis justified why the two 
Cypriot communities are not prepared for an effective diplomatic effort of settlement. But 
the failure is not only product of the above two points. It also stems from the failure of a 
successive third party to cultivate the ripeness or at least, to provide the kinds of 
inducements that would carry the peace process in action. At a more fundamental level, 
the lack of ripeness or absence of a hurting stalemate is also due to third-party 
involvement in the form of peacekeeping that has kept tensions at a moderate level and 
reduced the incentive for the two Cypriot communities to seek a political settlement. 
More of the mediation efforts were made by the UN, or in the name of UN, but all of 
them failed. However, since 1974, the three main third-party mediators- USA, UN, and 
UN- have helped to prevent conflict successfully and to avoid a new war. Over the same 
period, they have failed to advance reconciliation. All have declared renewed efforts and 
assigned efficient diplomats to the mediation effort. 
139 Sperling, J., and Kirchner, E., "Recasting The European Order," pp.64-67& pp74-75, 
Manchester University Press, 1997. 
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As it was also illustrated to the Chapter II of this thesis that the UN needs first of 
all international consensus and the provision of the necessary means for the 
accomplishment of its mission. 140 Recent mediation efforts, focused on advancing 
intercommunal talks between the two Cypriot communities, have a new important 
characteristic. Only in the 1990s Greece and Turkey had been drawn directly into and 
consulted about the details of a settlement. Clearly, any sort of negotiated solution to the 
conflict will require these two countries to agree to a settlement that is negotiated by the 
leaders of the two Cypriot communities. The historical record of mediation until know 
shows that, when a proposed settlement has not the endorsement of the one or other of the 
two countries, neither country has hesitated to use its influence on its representative 
community to undermine or stop the proposal. 141 An additional barrier to resolution has 
been the obvious reluctance of USA and NATO to put real pressure to the two 
motherlands of the Cypriot communities to resolve their differences over Cyprus (first 
mandatory step of an effective conflict resolution). During the Cold War the need to 
maintain the unity on NATO's southern flank was paramount and superseded the 
objective of achieving a permanent solution to the Cyprus problem. With the end of the 
Cold War, the Soviet threat has been replaced by troubles in the Balkans, the Middle 
East, and the Persian Gulf. These crises have had a higher priority than Cyprus in the 
140 While on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, the Secretary General supported that no 
solution can be found and the status quo is unlike " to change on an agreed basis as long as there is, both on 
the island and in the region, a lack of political will for such change." He became also as specific as he could 
by talking about "an already familiar scenario: the absence of agreement due essentially to the lack of 
political will on the Turkish Cypriot side." UN doc. S/ 1994/629, 30 May 1994, par. 52&53. 
141 Steams, M., Entangled Allies: U.S Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, pp. 107-116, 
New York, 1992. 
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overall concerns of NATO and the USA. With respect to the USA, the more powerful 
mediator is unlikely to do more than for a timely help in case of a conflict on Cyprus. 
Even though the USA has a strong interest to contribute to the solution of Cyprus impasse 
since it is directly influencing the Greek-Turkish relations, there are several reasons why 
the USA is likely to be reluctant to act. Despite its overall interest in peace, many of the 
rest of the US' interests in the region are conflicted and this is likely to lead to a degree of 
inaction. For USA, the safest approach is to do more of the same, using temporary 
solutions and equal pressure on both sides. It is a politically realistic view- no matter that 
it promises few or no lasting results. 
As a reward for the participation of Turkey in the 1991 Gulf War, member states 
of the Alliance continued to transfer arms to Turkey, while Washington and European 
arms manufacturers endorsed Turkey's ambitious military-modernization program. The 
WEU extended associate membership, in 1992, and voting privileges to Turkey, in 
1995.142 The primacy of post-Cold War geopolitical considerations has also encouraged 
Euro-USA strategists, to see Turkey's democratization process and economic 
modernization tPr"ough the priority of military considerations. The EU ratified a customs 
union with Turkey in 1995 with the same consideration.143 So, there is a strong interest of 
142 WEU (Western European Union) is a military alliance to effect collective security for its 
member states which emerged from the Treaties of Dunkirk (1947) and Brussels (1948). It was founded in 
1954, as an added forum of secUrity and co-operation in the Europe. Increased efforts at European 
integration have led the WEU more effective. 
143 In assumption the strategic value of Turkey presents the following: It has a population of 61 
millions, occupies one of the most strategic positions in the world, sharing borders with Syria, Iraq, and 
Iran, not to mention the Balkans and several countries on the southern flank of the former Soviet Union. 
The country supplied, as a member of NATO, bases and troops, most recently in the Gulf War. It has an 
overwhelming importance to USA as a strategic ally in a highly volatile Islamic region. Washington is 
counting on it to be a bulwark against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism into Europe. Turkey is also 
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the West to help Turkey in his entrance to the European family, as a serious effort to 
avoid the isolation of Turkey, a very important Islamic ally with borders very near to the 
oil regions ofMiddle East.I44 145 Thus, the interest of Turkey to align with the European 
norms and international law could create the condition of a "hurting stalemate" for the 
Cyprus problem with the parallel diplomatic effort of USA, Greece and the Cyprus 
official government. Greece also presents the advantage that is already an active member 
among the most industrialized nations outside of America, Western Europe, and Japan, and it aspires to be 
an economic hub for the vast region that surrounds it. Its strong historical and ethnic ties to neighboring 
countries, as well as its huge market and its commercial expertise, put it in a good position to achieve this 
aim, especially after the application of sounder budget policies and privatization of state-owned fmns. It is 
already the largest U.S trading partner in the region, but the potential is much greater. A new direction in 
politics comes at a time when Turkey's young and growing population base means that over 600,000 males 
annually reach military age, a number second in the NATO only to that in the United States. By maintaining 
the size of its Armed Forces relative to the declining force levels of other NATO states, Turkey maintains 
an additional advantage. The vulnerability of Turkey contrasted with its increasing importance underscores 
the challenge of solving outstanding issues, like the Cyprus problem, with its NATO ally and neighbor 
Greece. 
144 The strategic game at this moment favors mostly Turkey. The NATO forces believe that the 
Russia can not react under the present situation to the Western imposition in Central Europe, to the former 
zone of Russian influence (Balkans, Caucasus, Caspian Sea, former Turkish speaking Soviet Democracies), 
and in the region of Middle East. But after the operation against Serbia in Kosovo, Russia increased the 
military expenditures and decided to modernize its nuclear armory. The new Russian President Putin 
promises to level importantly the Russian defense spending. In response USA and its allies improve a policy 
with the following bases: (1) Turkey very powerful and with close connection with the EU; (2) Balkans 
under the control by the NATO forces; (3) Middle East with the dominance of peripheral forces Israel and 
Turkey. The Greek foreign policy contributes to this policy but sometimes there are some serious security 
issues to anticipate. Pry, V.P., War Scare, pp.272-293, Praeger Press, 1999, Platias, A., "The Nuclear 
Uncertainty," Ta Nea, 21 January 2000, Betinakis, K., "The Forgotten Treat," Ta Nea, 27 April 2000 and 
Stophopoulos, T., "Cold War Issues," Ta Nea, 24 February 2000. 
145 To this effort USA influenced and approved the decision of Greece to withdraw the veto that 
Greece had imposed to the EU against the acceptance of Turkey in the union as a candidate member. 
President Clinton sent warm letter to the prime minister of Greece and the American Ambassador in Athens 
N. Berns declared that:" I foresee that the decision ofEU will inaugurate a new era in the attempts of peace 
solution in the Greek-Turkish problems and it will positively influence the mediation of Cyprus issue." 
Papachelas, A, "Pressure of Washington," To Bhma, 12 December 1999. It is also remarkable that in a 
previous EU leaders meeting in Cardiff (June 1998) President Clinton had tried to change the decision-
veto of Greece about the entrance of Turkey in EU with the argument that "it might lead to a tension in the 
area." KinzerS.," Greece and Turkey Revive Dispute Over Cyprus," New York Times, 20 June 2000. 
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of the EU. 146 So, the Cyprus problem could be connected with the peace process that has 
already began within this sensitive region of the world. 
The latest argument that we have to examine covers the reasons that justify the 
interest of the EU for the Cyprus problem. The EU looks in the present time as the more 
efficient and hopeful mediator. Accession to the EU is a two-way relationship. Cyprus 
has a lot to gain from it, but it can also make a contribution in the creation of a unified 
Europe that will enjoy prosperity and security. Cyprus has a substantive significance as 
Europe's last base in the Mediterranean. The island can contribute greatly in the creation 
of a European security system that will safeguard the defense and security interests of the 
union in a region that is very near to the oil regions of Middle East. It should be asserted 
that Cyprus has excellent relations with all the Middle East countries. Thus, the island 
could serve as an economic, political, and cultural link between the EU and that important 
geopolitical region.I47Cyprus can play a role as bridge for cooperation among Europe, the 
Mediterranean basin, and the Middle East. It can be added that Cyprus has already chosen 
by many multinational firms as a location for their regional activity, thus having 
146 A relative comment after the accession of Turkey as a candidate member of EU: " Ankara 
must apprehend that it receives a historical opportunity to escape from the cast of mind of the past and to 
contribute like a European country. With this way the country will solve the problems with its neighbors, 
but also its huge internal problems, which have guide the country to its present prick and stagnancy." 
Kartalis, J., "The Sighs of a New Era," To Bhma, 12 December 1999. An other comment: "With a nudge 
from the USA, Turkey early today put economic promise ahead of national pride by accepting an invitation 
to EU membership that might ultimately scuttle its disputed claims to Cyprus and several Aegean islands." 
Williams J.C.," Turkey Oks Offer for membership in E.U," Los Angeles Times, 11 December 1999. 
147 Laipson supports that European see that their national security and stability affected by what 
happens in the Middle East. The more important factor is the demographics of the area. They watched 
warily the population bomb on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean (especially the 
populations of Turkey and Egypt). The second very important factor is economic interdependence and 
especially on dependence on region's oil. Laipson, E., "Europe's Role in the Middle East: Enduring Ties, 
Emerging Opportunities," The Middle East Journal, V. 44, No 1, pp.7-17, winter 1990 
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establishing regional headquarters. Wilson also comments that the commercial relations 
between Europe and Middle East are declining in significance. There is a little sign of any 
promising regional economic cohesion in the region. The trade links remain weak, labor 
mobility is declining, and governmental financial transfers have virtually ceased.l48 The 
entrance of Cyprus in the EU will create new perspectives. Cyprus will be a new place of 
economical interaction and cooperation between the two large geographical regions. 
Advantages of the island are besides of its location, the availability of highly educated 
managerial and technical staff, the excellent transportation and communication networks, 
and other infrastructure including a legal system based on internationally accepted 
principles of jurisprudence, low taxes, and special motives for the establishment of new 
enterprises. Thus , Cyprus offers EU in general, possibilities for enhancing their political, 
economic, cultural and strategic interests in this region. 
148 Wilson, R., " The Economic Relations of the Middle East: Toward Europe or Within the 
Region," Middle East Journal, V. 48, No.2, pp. 268-287, spring 1994. It is also characteristic that the trade 
ofEU with the OPEC countries have a share of7,5% ofEU exports and 8,2% ofEU imports and with the 
Non-EU Mediterranean countries 11,1% of EU exports and 8,6% of EU imports (Source: Economist 
Intelligence Unit, European Union report, 1998). The percentage is low according to two factors: 
geographical distance and potentiality of these markets. 
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VI. ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION 
A. STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 
The thesis foresees the future of the Cyprus problem through two different 
scenarios, projective environments. The first scenario suggests that the international 
conditions will allow to the Cyprus issue to meet an interdependent, transnational, and 
globalized culture even if both Cypriot communities' stances on sovereignty are 
prevented this at the moment. This obliges the disputants to take risks and to make 
concessions; this also requires new frameworks. Greek Cypriots seem to be willing to 
move out into a new framework more contemporary but need the acquiescence of Turkey 
and the Turkish Cypriots to do so. The EU can ideally embark on a federal project for a 
better future and Cyprus needs also to create a suitable political culture and civil society. 
A 'Federation' as a solution requires reciprocal contribution and adjustment to the 
separate conditions of the island. What is needed is a complex and transnational entity, in 
which governance is completely legitimate and is according to a· much wider set of 
principles that will secure the anticipation of the two communities according to the 
percentage of population that they possess. This framework would secure the application 
of international norms of pluralism and multi-ethnicity, human rights and prosperity. The 
bad experience of the 1960 constitution could provide with a lot of lessons-learned as a 
serious effort of avoiding the same errors. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the 
success of this operation would be the resultant of the two axes: the escape of the two 
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Cypriot communities by the strong ethno-nationalist sentiments and the exception of the 
Cyprus problem from the agenda of the Greek-Turkish problems. It would probably make 
it easier for Greece and Turkey to accommodate each other. This would certainly 
facilitate Turkey's relationship with the EU and would guide to a federal solution of 
Cyprus stalemate with the EU sphere of influence. From this perspective, NATO will 
have a regional peace dividend in its southern region, and would ease Euro-American 
tensions associated with the EU' s stance on Turkey. 
The first scenario has only one option -solution of the problem: Reintegration 
with the parallel achievement of a sustainable peace on the island. The supporters of this 
option, as Prodromou emphasizes, see "institutional power sharing as a way to square the 
circle between democracy and nationalism by constructing a liberal politico-economic 
system that avoids the potential excesses of the unfettered majority (fear of Turkish 
Cypriots) and prevents a tyranny of the unfettered majority (as greek Cypriots fear)." It 
must also apply to economic mechanisms designed to give both communities a stake in 
the country's economic development.149Basic precondition for this settlement will consist 
of a new effort of the USA towards Turkey to a decisive democracy promotion with the 
parallel enforcement in this country to contribute to an island's problem settlement, a fact 
that will increase its reliability in the NATO and EU organs. I 50 
149 Prodromou, E.,"Reintegrating Cyprus, the need for a New Approach," Survival: JJSS 
Quarterly, pp.7-21, autumn 1998. 
150 Wilkinson, M.J. , pp10-24. Wilkinson also notes: "The USA is best placed to be the region's 
honest broker. As demonstrated in the Imia incident, Washington can mediate agreements that the two sides 
could not achieve directly between themselves. Moreover, it is only the Americans who have the a credible 
capability to intervene militarily in the region. The USA, of course has its own reasons to be engaged. The 
strategic importance of Greece and Turkey is unquestioned, given their historical ties with the United 
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The alternative scenario of the Cyprus issue emphasizes the point that Turkey will 
decide to continue to show its local power in the Eastern Mediterranean.J5I The country 
will continue to exploit its geopolitical position and its Islamic character with the full 
coverage of the USA, since it serves a precious ally in a strategically important region. 
The effect of Turkey's strategic upgrade has been to maintain continuity in the West's 
policy towards Turkey in the immediate post-Cold war years. Furthermore, the role of the 
military in the domestic political scene of Turkey will be seen as a very determinant 
factor, too.I52Thus, Turkey's stance, with a solution of the Cyprus problem far from its 
States, critical geographic location, NATO membership, and the extensive military facilities potentially 
available to U.S forces in a crisis." 
151 It is characteristic that the decision-acceptance of Turkey in the EU as a candidate member 
created two different schools of thoughts in this country. The first supposes that the success was product of 
the recognition of Turkey as a 'strategic player of Europe," and Europe adopted the American view about 
the role and significance of Turkey. The second that the success was result of European activation with a 
little help by the USA. It is apparent that the two different schools react in a different way to the European 
invitation. Kourkoulas. A., "Tambere Divides Turkey," To Bhma, 24 October 1999. However, both of two 
schools share the same opinion about the position of Turkey to the borders of European and Asian 
continents. As the Foreign Minister of this country emphasizes:" Turkey has a geo-strategic dimension that 
it previously was not very conscious of. The downfall of the old Soviet order, a lot of new problems but also 
a lot of new chances surfaced. Something like 20 countries with whom we have historical and cultural 
affmities became independent states. These changes, and a growing consciousness of our European and 
Asian identity, have provided us with a new approach to this vast area instead of just being concentrated on 
one thing. That fixation was the result of a limited outlook, of feeling that we had to resolve a conflict over 
whether we are European or Asian. Culturally, historically and geographically, we are a global state, and 
now we are becoming more aware of that." Kinzel, S., "Turkey Finds New Friends," New York Times, 28 
Dec 1997. 
152 The role of military in the political scene of Turkey is a serious problem and creates a lot of 
doubts on Turkey's readiness to join EU. There are also a lot of anomalies in the work of public authorities, 
human rights are persistently violated and minorities are not treated according the EU-standards. The 
standards of human rights, democracy and the role of law do not follow European lines. The situation of 
economic , social and cultural rights is quite distorted. The rights to associate and to strike for instance are 
subject to a number of restriction. Freedom of expression in media is provided by Turkish legislation. In the 
end the governmental situation has been very unstable in the past years. Riemer, A., pp.13-17. 
Additionally, the following articles give the size of the problem. Zaman emphasizes: "Turkey is playing a 
growing strategic role as a bridge between Europe and the oil-rich Caspian Sea region, as a bulwark against 
hostile regimes in Iran and Iraq and a stabilizing force for in the Balkans. Many officials wonder whether 
Turkey will be prepared to yield huge chunks of its sovereignty to a supra-national body in Brussels. In the 
near future, the most delicate issue is the continuing intervention of the Turkish military in foreign and 
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interests, increased tensions, delayed EU accession, hurt tourism that makes a primary 
economic source for all the parties of the dispute, and war calculations will also improve 
to the strategic game of the region. The Greek-Greek Cypriot axis will respond with a 
new a deterrence plan, new programs of obtaining modem weaponry since there are 
enough economic capabilities to do so, and a new warming of a joint defense 
dogmas.I53Ethno-nationalism and antagonistic tactics will arise again, and the Cyprus' 
stalemate will continue to exist for the future years. 
There are two solutions-options in the occasion of the second scenario: status quo 
that consists of a common BA TNA of the two Cypriot communities, and partition. The 
first option as already illustrated to the analysis of the Conflict, in the chapter V of this 
thesis, is unsustainable and irrelevant to any efforts towards meaningful peace building in 
Cyprus. At the same time the strong militarisation of Cyprus and the recent events, like 
domestic policy ... For most pro -Western Turks, both EU membership and the army's role are viewed as 
the most solid guarantees against the treat of Islamic militancy. Relinquishing one in favor of the other will 
be a tough choice." Zaman, A.," Turkey Pledges to Meet Terms," Washington Post, 29 Jan 2000. 
Generally, EU waits that the Turkish military will relinquish their decisive role that they have on politics for 
about 76 years now, as the guardians of the cosmic character of the Turkish State. Europe is absolute about 
this fact and there is no possibility to be tolerant to it. But from the other side the governors of the Turkish 
army are reluctant -to accept it. Boudreaux, R., "Turkish Military Sees EU Entry Terms as a Threat to its 
Power," Los Angeles Times, 5 Mar 2000,and the Associated Press, "Turkey Military Discusses Election," 
New York Times, 14 April2000. Betinakis, in the end, comments to the same point: "Turkey plans to spend 
for its defense spending program about 150 billions dollars until the year 2030. This huge armory program 
enforces drastically the Turkish generals, who don't interest a lot about democratic ideologies. Someone 
must persuade them that they, the real representatives of Kemal ideology, must stay in the margin in favor 
of what they dreamed about so much time: The attachment of Turkish State in the West." Betinakis, K.," 
New Scenery," Ta Nea, 14 Dec 1999. 
153 This situation will create new tensions and a new cycle of instability to this sensitive comer of 
the Mediterranean Sea. A relative comment that emphasizes the danger from Prof. Teti Frank: "The 
weapons don't change the strategy but change the national objectives." NS 4230/ seminar in strategic 
planning .. Moustakis and Sheehan also add the risk of war between the countries is real was demonstrated 
when Greece became a member of the WEU. The WEU states attached a protocol to the article of Greek 
accession declaring that the Article 5 defence guarantee would not apply to war between Greece and 
another NATO member. Moustakis, F., and Sheehan, M., "Earthquake Heals Aegean Rift," Jane's 
Intelligence Review, V. 11, No 12, p.12, Dec 1999. 
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the Imia-incident, episodes on the "Green line," arm-race, S-300 acquisition, are the most 
urgent warning sign of a profound change to the island's situation. The possibility of new 
incidents remains so high that allies of both states concerned with maintaining regional 
peace and stability, must constantly engage in defusing minor crises and confrontations in 
order to avoid real and deadly conflict. 
The second solution refers to the island's de jure division along lines consistent 
with the de facto separation, which aggravate regional conflicts and potential hot-spots, 
exacerbate bilateral tensions between Greece and Turkey, and guide the arm-race to new 
efforts. Prodromou also emphasizes three serious consequences of the last option that 
affect seriously the issue of peace in the Eastern Mediterranean: First, partition would 
institutionalize the premise that the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities are 
incapable of peaceful co-existence within a unified state, thus diminishing the likelihood 
of long-term peace in regions with a history of intra- and inter-state conflict along ethnic 
lines. Second, by recasting relations between t~e two states in terms of hostile ethnic 
entities, partition would undermine the possibilities of Cyprus to become the key to a 
broader Greek-Turkish rapprochement. And third, the partition would send mixed 
messages regarding the normative and strategic importance of democracy to transatlantic 
peace-builders. It is more apparent on the Turkish Cypriot side, where the satisfaction of 
Turkey's with the parallel conservation of the same Turkish Cypriot leader since 1973 
have precluded any accurate evaluation of the indigenous Turkish Cypriot's population's 
wishes about their future. Thus, partition creates the very outcomes its advocates want to 
avoid and, as such is an irrational choice for maximizing transatlantic strategic 
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interests.l54 From this point of view, a division of the island or recognition of the TRNC 
will be disastrous, as it would not reduce the security dilemma of the four main parties, 
and neither would it reduce the nationalist ideologies. The division of the island in two 
different states would perpetuate perceptions of injustice and continue the current security 
problems. 
The fact is that Turkey faces major choices in its domestic and foreign politics, 
many of which involve cementing its relations towards the West or facing increasing 
isolation at least from the west. The Cyprus solution will greatly facilitate its western 
orientation. Since the fact that the Turkey and Turkish Cypriot sides are obviously the 
less flexible at the Cyprus' table of negotiations, there are some actions that could 
positively influence the international community. So, they could gain credibility in the 
West by withdrawing from parts of the land on island, apologizing for the illegal aspects 
ofthe 1974 invasion, or for the lethal brutality along the buffer zone in 1996.155 156 
154 Prodromou, E., pp.1 0-11. 
155 We must refer that the Cyprus problem is not necessarily the first thing Europe States think 
about when assess Turkey's human rights record. There is more the violation of human rights from the 
Kurdish problem. But Cyprus has the advantage that is more directly connect with issues of NATO/ 
Western solidarity. We emphasize also the recent official declaration of German EU commissioner Gunter 
Verheugen, responsible for the EU expansion's issues that Turkey will be treated by the EU just as any 
other candidate country, and we are not going to make discounts on accession criteria for its sake ... and the 
EU waits a final arrangement of Cyprus issue. Associated Press: Royter, 12 Apr.2000. Another article also 
emphasizes the difficulties that will have the final acceptance of Turkey in Europe. It is from an ambassador 
from EU: "Turks say they are willing to talk about technical matters like financing and development 
projects, but not about political matters. When they talk to a country, they want to discuss the full range of 
our concerns, which in the case of Turkey means democracy, human rights, the Kurdish issue, and at this 
point the Ocalan trial. Since they refuse to do that, the dialogue is practically frozen." Kinzer, S., "Europe's 
Tie to Turkey Turns Chillier," New York Times, 14 March 1999. 
156 The strategic assessment of the position of Turkey in Europe also notes the following 
characteristic points: " Of all NATO members, Turkey is the most strategically located and the least secure. 
Turkey is experiencing Islamic movements, demographic pressures, and economic stress, secular political 
parties are weak and have yielded to the military's influence. Ankara's crackdowns on the Kurds in northern 
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B. A PROCESS WITH FLEXIBILITY FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE 
PROBLEM 
A process with flexibility for the establishment of a solution must first of all 
exclude one occasion. It will assure that first of all the ethno-nationalism and tensions 
caused thereby are absent from the diplomatic table. This is because a federal solution 
attempted in the middle of moderate or high level of hi-communal tension will instead 
exacerbate problems and lead to a wider conflict. The experience of a premature federal 
solution in 1960 is a strong proof of it. The lack of trust for the intentions of the other 
side, fears of domination by a more powerful adversary, the resulting high uncertainty 
about the prospects of amicable cohabitation and cooperation, and the actions of other 
party especially the distinct possibility of loss of the game take a bad turn (premature 
breakdown), and might make even a well-intended party reluctant to gamble anything of 
the make first recessions in a centralized federal solution. This is the main rea.son that the 
thesis will accept the proposal ofHadjipavlou and Trigeorgis according to this as the only 
way to test each other's intensions in practice without risking ruin is precisely first to try 
an integrated solution on a limited scale, with an option to expand in case of success and 
Iraq have complicated relations with Iraq, Syria, and the EU. Turkish instability threatens U.S interests in 
the Middle East, Central Asia, and potentially NATO.The EU has denied Turkey the candidate status it 
seeks while giving it to Cyprus, alienating Turkey's leaders. Citing shortcomings in democratic 
development and human rights as well as the Cyprus situation, the EU is unlikely to consider Turkey for 
membership as long as it continues to repress Kurdish nationalists and reject a political settlement for 
Cyprus, and while Turks continue migrating in large numbers to Western Europe. This has alienated many 
Turks, who increasingly look to the Caucasus and Central Asia for markets. Turkey has a large military 
establishment of 639,000 troops, which includes 15 division-equivalents, 440 combat aircraft, and 37 naval 
combatants. Turkey is modernizing its forces and improving readiness. NATO reinforcement would be 
needed to defend against major aggression." Strategic Assessment, National Defense University, "Europe: 
How much Unity, How Effective," p.77. US Printing Office, Washington, 1999. 
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an option to contract/ abandon with limited losses in the event of failure. I 57 This proposal 
for limited application of a centralized federal solution with powerful guarantees will 
connect with the success of"pre-negotiation cycle" of Mitchell's model and aims to avoid 
a premature breakdown of the settlement's process. Mitchell' s dynamic protraction 
model of de-escalation shows how conflicts may circle back to earlier stages. But the 
successful and well-trained third-party mediation must apply different roles at different 
stages in the process of conflict management. In Cyprus' protracted regional conflict this 
obtain primary significance because the history of the conflict teaches about continual 
breakdowns with terrific consequences. ISS 
A cooperative solution based on satisfying underlying needs and long -term 
interests rather than compromising on positions can be better pursued in an environment 
where formal negotiations are proceeded by a flexible, interactive, noncommittal process 
of informal prenegotiation. The intercommunal contacts must first of all encourage and 
facilitate at all levels by an efficient third-party mediator. The rewards also for the 
disputants' parties with a final settlement will also facilitate the procedure. Generally, the 
costs and the values of the rewards themselves have an impact on their desirability for 
157 Hadjipavlou, M and Trigeorgis, L,"An Evolution Approach to Conflict Resolution," Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, V. 37, No.2, p.352, June 1993. The thesis will make application of the Mitchell 
model (Chapter II) for the conflict resolution of the Cyprus conflict. 
158 The London-Zurich accords of 1959, which led to the Constitutional Accord of 1960, are a 
striking example of a mature political settlement: It failed because: (1) it was imposed by third parties; (2) it 
was too rigid to address the needs and interests of the two Cypriot communities; (3) there was minimal 
third-party involvement in implementation, particularly when disputes arose over implementation of key 
provisions in the Constitution and without a controlled testing period. Thus, the accords contributed to the 
outbreak of conflict; the legacy of that failure has yet to be overcome. Basic effort of the thesis is to avoid a 
premature breakdown. 
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both the parties making the demand and the deciding whether they accept or reject a 
settlement proposition.I59 In addressing the challenge of creating an environment 
conductive to the development of mutual reassurance and confidence building it is urgent 
a negotiated agreement is following by steps of conciliation and testing, before the full-
implementation of the agreed federal structure. 
The success of a "pre-negotiation" effort (or Druckman's 'give and take' period) 
can connect with the creation of a "rivalry mature environment." It is based, according to 
a theory of Kuenne, in a prospective interaction of decisions to take place in a manner 
that restrains conflict through the fostering of mind-sets, institutions, and conditions that 
enhance cooperation. It is the required environment for the implementation of an 
integrated solution on a limited scale in the first period and with the intention to expand 
in a final period to the entire island. A state of mature rivalry is characterized by the 
existence of the following attributes: (1) The attainment of assured positions of eminence 
within the community by similarly situated rivals; (2) rapid and extensive flows of 
information among rivals concerning their autonomous actions; (3) an assurance of rapid 
responses by rivals to one's autonomous actions with the clear potential to neutralize 
159 We refer the offer of the USA that it must keep on the table of negotiations of an aid of $250 
millions to finance special projects that are contingent on steps taken toward the reunification of Cyprus. An 
also useful instrument could be the stopping of the embargo to the Turkish Cypriot party. Additionally, 
according to a study of Sorokin, states or parties will be more likely to accept rewards when the rewards are 
valuable and the demands are small. But from the other side, although offering a reward increases the 
probability of compliance without the use of violent methods or even the use of military force, it is no 
guarantee of achieving compliance mostly with political demands. The primary advantage of rewards is they 
are less risky than threats. Rewards yield compliant behavior with little downside: as long as the cost of the 
reward is relatively low, then parties should be expected to prefer the low-risk strategy to the uncertainly 
and high costs of military conflict. This could have an ideal application on Cyprus issue. The thesis believes 
that Turkey will try to eliminate the cost of occupation of the northern part of the island in the near future. 
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anticipated gains or render them negative in prospect; ( 4) Risk-averse attitudes by rivals 
to autonomous actions that may directly or indirectly threaten seriously their assured 
positions within the community; and (5) a sufficient time span of coexistence to assure 
rivals of the indefinite maintainability of these community characteristics.I60Practically, 
the rivals will be the two Cypriot communities; the place of interaction will consist during 
the pre-negotiation stage of a common commercial zone for the two communities.I6I It 
would be open without any restriction to members of the two communities at any time. 
The extension of this zone will depend of a common decision of the two communities 
with the presence of the third-party mediator. A first thought is an extension of 5-7% of 
the island's territory, in the beginning stage. It will be the place of testing a limited in size 
cooperative, interactive and centralized federal governance with the contribution of the 
two Cypriot communities. At the same time the two parties continue to maintain two 
separate, decentralized zones to alleviate insecurities, fears of domination, and initial 
aversion to change and mostly to maintain a fallback position. The Turkish troops could 
remain temporarily in the Turkish controlled zone to help alleviate Turkish Cypriot fears 
of insecurity, although it would be desirable if both sides reduce troops to an equal and 
limited level. But, the common zone must be demilitarized (See Appendix A). 
Sorokin, L.G., "The Role Of Rewards in Conflictual International Interactions," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, V.40, No 4, pp. 659-677, December 1996. 
160 Kuenne E. R., "Conflict Management in Mature Rivalry," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
V.33, No 3, pp.554- 565, September 1999. 
161 The first thought about this zone was also included in the proposals of UN Boutros Boutros 
Ghali about the confidence -building measures .. " Crawshaw, N., " Cyprus; a Crisis of Confidence," The 
World Today, Royal Institute of International Studies, V. 50, No 4, pp. 70-73, April 1994. 
104 
In a testing period of certain time (maybe 3-5 years) the zone will receive policing 
and justice functions administered by the UN and proper international committees (with 
the auspice of EU in cooperation with the UN) with a specific area of interest that will 
assure and control the success of the stage in a possibly risk-averse attitude by rivals to 
autonomous actions with the danger of a premature break-down. All these committees 
during the application of the stage would be under the control of a main third-part 
mediator, probably from the EU, with the proper training and with the intension of 
establishing a healthy mediation process. These committees would temporarily change to 
federal ministries with a certain area of interest. The emphasis and the attention in this 
zone should be on creating the social-psychological, educational-developmental, 
economic, and institutional infrastructure and first of all to the cultivation of fruitful 
cohabitation and cooperation into essential application in a centralized federal system in 
the common zone. The establishment of a "rivalry mature environment" will be in plain 
words a development model toward a centralized federal system, which uses the 
mediation as an instrument. It is a process in a context of developing relationships; 
beginning before the actual bargaining and long after a mutual agreement is reached. It 
will improve also a continual exchange of information between the two Cypriot 
communities with the full coverage of Cyprus media. Providing channels of 
communication and verifying information facilitates the prenegotiation stage and help to 
prevent breakdowns in negotiation. Information is one of the most powerful instruments 
of influence, but the extent to which information tools can be mobilized and used to reach 
the rivals is a major determinant of success in a de-escalation model. The focus should be 
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on healing, conciliation, and gestures of goodwill to build trust and confidence, and allow 
the two sides in a joint search toward resolving the conflict cooperatively. The 
developmental process will be less structured and more flexible, permitting significant 
learning to occur that allows the two Cypriot communities to approach each other and to 
cultivate trust and reciprocity. It would also encourage the parties to move away from 
formal positions and to express more freely their true interests and needs with the parallel 
attainment of assured positions of eminence. 
During this period, distractions from implementing a federal structure and 
political complications should be limited. Turkish Cypriots will obtain the much-needed 
recognition and acceptance by the international community, an end to the economic 
embargo, and an improved standard of living through economic cooperation in a Cyprus 
that works in line with European norms. The Greek Cypriot side, in return of donating 
political recognition and accepting some painful realities, would obtain greater flexibility 
for the return of more refugees on a greater piece of land, increased security, an ideal 
opportunity to demonstrate in action its good intensions for cooperation and a reward of 
extending the centralized federal system with the proper conditions and guarantees for 
further development. The benefit also for the two motherlands is that they will liberate 
from one of the most serious problems and will direct their interest to the other issues. 
This joint area as an experimental nucleus of a cooperative, interactive, centralized 
federation that could potentially and gradually expand to the whole island on successful 
intercommunal action. Another proposition could be a democratic referendum after a 
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phase of 5 or 1 0 years, separately conducted in the two Cypriot communities. The result 
could guide the further motions. 
The next Mitchell's stage is the "consolidation stage" that will stabilize the 
already developing infrastructure, before ratifying the full-scale resolution. Another 
critical point of this operation will depend from the strategy that the third-party mediator 
must follow during the "pre-negotiation" stage. Last's model can assure an atmosphere 
conductive to positive contribution of the disputants and facilitate the settlement and 
resolution. It will assure the success of the previous proposal-settlement. One can note, 
something very important for the Cyprus problem, the decreasing military role the model 
introduces in its application. At the tactical level of his cooperation there will be 
improvement of the following techniques: (1) Constabulary intervention, which deters the 
actions of opposing forces. UNFICYP must undertake this role with the purpose to halt or 
deter actions of the parties. It is mainly a defensive tactic, but its limitation is a basic 
requirement of settlement process. This duty must be extended to maintain rule of law 
over the belligerent forces, with their active consent and cooperation; (2) Go-between 
mediation, which prevents misinterpretation of the other side's actions, further stifling 
escalating violence and also to keep open communication channels. The third-party 
mediator acts in the presence of both parties at the same time, holding well-organized 
meetings. This role can help to preserve stability and enhance confidence in a congenial 
environment; (3) Conciliation, which consists of actions and discussions to reduce the 
hostility each opposing force, feels for the other. In the process, conciliation erodes 
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negative stereotypes that characterize conflict; (4) Education and attitude change, as a part 
of comprehensive strategy of reconciliation. It is also apart of Secretary General's "Set of 
ideas."I62 This is just one of the many points at which civilian agencies and the mediation 
need to coordinate their activities. 
It consists a basic point for the development of the federal state. Last's technique 
applies mostly to the effort of third-party mediator to help belligerents move beyond of a 
possible impasse by providing assurances and incentives. Polter also proposes the use of 
team negotiators under a central control of a chief/central mediator. These teams will 
ideally consist the committees of control according to the previous plan of organizing a 
common zone. From an intergroup relations perspective, their competitive orientation and 
low levels of cooperation and trust may impede teams. But, from a cognitive perspective, 
advantages should accrue to teams because more people are present to generate additional 
ideas, bring a greater number of perspectives to the problem, and perform strategically 
important roles during the negotiation. The advantage is that teams outperformed 
162 A proposal was: " a hi-communal committee will be established to review the text books used 
in schools on each side and make recommendations for the removal of material that is contrary to the 
population of goodwill and close relations between the two communities, the committee may also 
recommend positive measures to promote that objective." UN S/ 2472 21 Aug 1992, paragraph 23. In 
another report the S.G report: " Both sides must work more effectively to promote tolerance and 
reconciliation. Both have been going in this respect ... the two sides, despite their professed aim of forging 
an agreed settlement and creating a bicommunal and bizonal federation, carry out an endless propaganda 
campaign against each other that is incompatible with this objective. Even school textbooks are not exempt 
from that campaign." UN S/ 26777, 22 Nov 1993, paragraph 102. In that direction, an establishment of a 
common committee from Greek and Turkish Cypriot scholars, with the help of experts from EU and UN, 
for a common historical project about the political history of Cyprus and the review of the text-books of the 
two communities schools would help bring the two sides closer. 
108 
individual opponents and were perceived as having more power and more ideas for a 
settlement.I63 
Briefly, principled negotiation and integrative negotiating techniques are 
applicable to all stages of the de-escalation model. The root of the Cyprus regional 
conflict is the problem of security dilemmas. Thus, any professional consultation and 
problem-solving workshops must adopt this target. The mediator must secure the 
extermination of this fear after initial segregation and before the links between 
communities atrophy. Basic instruments that he will use in his effort are diplomatic/ 
political influence, the proper use of information and economic instruments. Each of 
these instruments can be used to influence the process of the settlement. It is also 
apparent that the mediation must have close cooperation and coordination with 
UNFICYP, which remains indispensable part of this plan. Certainly, the dividing line 
between the military and diplomatic responsibilities during the pre-negotiation stage will 
not be as sharp and clear but at the operational level, it is essential (See figure 2).164 
163 Polter, J., "Intergroup Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, V. 40, No 4, pp.678-697, 
December 1996. 
164 Last, M. D.," Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-Escalation in Peacekeeping 
Operations, "pp.120-123, Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 1997. 
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Figure2: Contact Skills and Stages of De-Escalation, Last. 
The end-solution would be a federal state with the structure and function 
according to the proposal of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali: A federal 
system in which general and local administrative units-the two Cypriot sides- coexist with 
shared and independent powers, neither having supreme authority over the other. With 
the previous thoughts Mitchell's consolidation and the final resolution (or Druckman's 
endgame) must conclude the following basic points: a single federal government with one 
international personality, dominated by Greek Cypriots but with Turkish Cypriots holding 
significant offices, delineated veto powers and government positions according to their 
population's percentage, i.e. ethnic proportionality in the allocation of certain 
opportunities and offices, mutual veto in decision-making; two state governments each 
possessing considerable autonomy (ethnic autonomy); essential bizonality, with controls 
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on the rights of refugees to return to their homes ; 165a Turkish sector reduced from its 30 
or less percent of the overall territory of the island, with the once flourishing city of 
Varosha and its environs returned to the Greek-Cypriot province, which means 
reciprocated concessions; a phased withdrawal of Turkish and Greek forces at a speed 
and to a level acceptable to both communities and after the mutual improvement of the 
confidence; continued guarantor rights for at least Greece and Turkey; ·activation of the 
official federal state in the European organs with representatives from both of the two 
Cypriot communities as a product of elections for this purpose and percentage of deputies 
according to the population of the two communities; provisions for peacekeeping forces 
and new duties about to monitor the provisions of the arrangement only for a certain time; 
a single currency; a written constitution; 166 a legislature and a court system that can 
arbitrate disputes between the different communities, which implies a strict 
depoliticization of the judicial system;167 and at least three levels of exclusive federal 
responsibility, bureaucracy, international relations and taxation. The federal government 
will have independent power that can be increased according to the interpretation of the 
federal constitution. The cumulative interests of the local units tend to define the joint 
interests of both Cypriot communities. In the end, the mission of the federal government 
165 The responsibilities of federal government and the two Cypriot conununities government 
would ideally be according to the federal proposal of "Set of Ideas " of Boutros Boutros Ghali. Maybe 
further research could lead to a percentage participation of the two Cypriot communities in organs like the 
Council ofMinisters and the federal legislature. 
166 The United Nations Charter, the Charter of the European Union, and the European Convention 
on Human Rights, will become part of the New Constitution of Cyprus as is a prerequisite for membership 
of these organizations. The 1960 Constitution will be replaced by a new functional constitution. 
167 The legal system must comply with European Court of Justice and Human Rights legislation. 
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couches in terms of fulfilling the wishes of the inhabitants, promoting their interests and 
improving the level of their lives.I68 Priority task of this stage is the maintaining of a 
cooperative, non-adverbial level of relationships, the promoting of a sustainable 
economic growth, and in the end a peaceful integration process between the two Cypriot 
communities. 
UNFICYP will have a very serious role in this settlement effort and can serve the 
following functions: to organize policing and justice functions as it was also referred in 
the common commercial zone; to monitor the withdrawal of mainland military forces on 
Cyprus and verify the demilitarization; to control and to be always in position to ask an 
constabulary intervention during the application of the de-escalation model; to supervise 
or to monitor elections and to help make sure they are fair and honest; to assist with other 
aspects of civil administration, in particular monitoring aspects of the post-solution 
government which may depend on various proportions of people from each to work; and 
to continue to help with coordination with the third-party mediator in such areas as it is 
the creation of a proper environment for the coordination of bicommunal activities. All 
the above functi<?ns hopefully won't be necessary after the establishment of the resolution 
stage (or Druckman "endgame"). 
The ideal guarantee of a previous solution is the full membership of Cyprus state 
in the EU. It will assure security for both sides; it would provide for the best-protected 
system against future outside interference; it would influence the trade and enh.ance 
168 The thesis to this point made an application ofNordlinger theory of" Six successful conflict is 
regulating practices, "and Lijphart theory of "Democracy in plural societies" to the specific conditions and 
characteristics of Cyprus regional conflict (Chapter II). 
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economic opportunities; and it would allow, with the cooperation ofUN, the exercise of 
the fundamental human rights of free movement, settlement, and ownership by all the 
citizens. It can also secure the political control by the Turkish Cypriots in their zone and 
alleviate their fears of eventual domination by the majority the Greek Cypriots. For this 
reason, the EU should be involved early in the process through a consultative, facilitative 
and supervisory role. It should also improve the Cypriot communities' readiness for 
compromise by offering substantial financial and political support for both overcoming 
the existing division after an agreement has been reached between the two Cypriot 
communities. One element of that support should be a package of pre-accession aid.J69 
The EU could also assist the Turkish Cypriot community's readiness for compromise by 
helping Turkey to a clear and unequivocal perspective of a full EU membership and at the 
same time to postpone this procedure if there is no likelihood of resolving the Cyprus 
problem. It is also positive the free zone to adopt the EU standards in all the spheres of 
activities as well as the European currency with free convertibility to the market rates 
these measures with additional economic assistance could reinforce the economic effort, 
to accommodate refugee resettlement, and in the end, to lift the north's standard of life. It 
is also possible, since the island fulfills all the necessary criteria, to participate in the 
Monetary Union. In the end, the EU could anticipate and the last problem of this project-
settlement: The problem of extension of the presence ofUNFICYP on the island. It would 
be a result of the economical problems of the organization. A solution is the replacement 
169 Kramer, H., "The Cyprus Problem and European Security," Survival: The IISS Quarterly, pp. 
26-30, autumn 1997. 
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of the UNFICYP with a European peace building force, either under WED-control, or as 
a part of the Reaction Force of the EU that is under consideration, too. 170 
C. IMPLICATIONS AND FINAL REMARKS 
The Cyprus problem has been in the international agenda not only since Turkey's 
197 4 invasion but also since then, with increasing importance. In the face of Turkish 
politics and political behavior, twenty-six years of negotiations have failed to produce a 
settlement. At the same time, the problem of Cyprus illustrates the inability of a 
deliberate third-party initiative to encourage Turkey's democratic consolidation and 
foreign policy behavior according to the international law. Under the previous analysis, a 
settlement based on a bizonal and bicommunal form of federation seems to be reasonable, 
feasible and viable. Reintegration versus either maintaining the status quo or formally 
partitioning the island is the best choice for resolving the problem. It assumes, of course, 
' 
that all citizens will enjoy universally accepted rights and opportunities all over the 
island. Given the realities of Cyprus' geography, economy, size, distribution of natural 
resources, demography and the political failures of the past, a federal solution seems to 
the only pragmatic way out of the impasse.I7I The prospect of Cyprus' accession to the 
170until now, WEU is limited mainly to the jobs outlined in a declaration agreed by the WEU 
Council of Minister in June 1992 at Petersberg, near Bonn; under the 'Petersberg tasks' military units from 
member states, acting under the authority of the WEU can be used for humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping 
and other crisis management tasks, including peacemaking, in cooperation with the OSCE and the UN 
Security Council. Thus, WEU cooperated with NATO in monitoring the UN embargo on Serbia and 
Montenegro 1993-96, helped to set up a unified Croat-Muslim police force to support the administration of 
the city ofMostar in Bosnia in 1994-5, and in the end helped restructure and train the Albanian police force 
in 1997. McCormick, J., "Understanding the EU, "pp.209-214, StMartin's Press, 1999. 
171 To this point the thesis recapitulates the following points: the international situation as it was 
improved to the Chapter II, the variables-continual steps of conflict resolution as it was improved in 
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European family provides a unique opportunity for all parties concerned to rise to the 
occasion and show their commitment to the principles and values that are vital to created 
the western civilization. A solution to the problem of the island must satisfy the whole 
population. In any occasion, there is not a solution that includes occupation armies. The 
Cypriots themselves, especially the Turkish Cypriot leadership, should realize that they 
would anticipate their problems better through pacific means, political and administrative 
adjustments, renovation of political thinking and with sincere conciliatory attitudes. No 
one can doubt that a meaningful political order that will allow the two communities to co-
exist in peace and under conditions of stability and security is better than a place of 
continual military confrontation and dispute. 
Only a few months after the entrance of the 21st century, there are some new 
points that drive a new motivation to resolve the Cyprus issue. As this thesis claims the 
beginning of the desirable solution, the smoothening of the relations between the two 
motherlands, is in a new hopeful process. As Kinzer emphasizes, Greek-Turkish relations 
had been improving slowly for about a year, but it took the harmful earthquakes in both 
countries to push them toward an indication of friendship. Each sent rescue teams to help 
the other, and their gestures were greeted by "waves of ecstatic publicity and popular 
emotion."172 It was the second catastrophe that added momentum to efforts to bring the 
Chapter V and Turkey's acceptance of its west orientation with the introduction of Cyprus solution in the 
priorities of its foreign policy. 
172 Kinzel, S.,"A Sudden Friendship Blossoms Between Greece and Turkey." New York Times, 13 
Sep. 1999. Two important points according to this article are: First, Nicholas Berns, United States of USA 
in Athens declared that: "I think we're in the middle of a new phenomenon that you could call seismic 
diplomacy or earthquake diplomacy. Images that people saw on TV had tremendous political symbolism, 
and there is an opportunity for both sides to build on that." And the second, with a great influence to the 
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two countries together. The war in Kosovo was the first. There was a strong cooperation 
in refugee problems and other matters and it "seemed to emerge with a renewed sense 
that if they join hands, they can have a decisive effect in shaping events in this 
region."l73The more significant step was the decision of Greece that it would no longer 
block Turkey's application for membership in the EU.l74 Besides the cooperation in 
Kosovo and the recent earthquakes Greece acted in a good will with the following 
actions: (1) the country adopted the Turkish position for cooperation in issues of second 
significance like the establishment of new activities and cooperation in special activities -
tourism, security and economic issues, environment- and decided to abandon the 
traditional political position that any connection or cooperation of the two countries is 
dependent first of all, upon progress in Cyprus and Aegean issues. (2) The support of 
Turkey's candidacy in EU has been made with the same precondition. (3) Greece offered 
improvement of the political climate is the changing of the Turkish and Greek press, both of which have for 
years sought to win readers by fanning the flames of chauvinistic nationalism. According to an article of 
Milliyet a columnist Sami Kohen notes: "Turkish people and Greek people are not enemies of each other. 
The politicians are the ones who create the crises." Besides to it, the same newspaper sent a note to Greece 
after the great earthquake of Turkey" Efharisto Poli File" (Thank you my friend). And the newspaper with 
the largest circulation in Greece answered: "We are all Turks," an astonishing statement in light of the 
relations between the two countries. It is fact that the positive Greek response led to a major change in the 
Turkish public's perception of Greece. Moustakis, F., and Sheehan, M., "Earthquake Heals Aegean Rift," 
Jane's Intelligence Review, V. 11, No 12, p.12, Dec 1999. 
173 Kinzer, S., " A Natural Disaster Helps Draw Two Enemies Closer," New York Times, 22 
August 1999. 
17 4 Four are the benefits that Greece expects from the entrance of Turkey in European family: ( 1) 
The adaptation by Turkey of European norms will greatly facilitate the solution of the bilateral problems; 
(2)the Greek enterprises and general economic activities will have a huge market for action very near to the 
country; (3) The activation of Greece, in a lot of domains of action, in a place where there is historical 
heritage, since the EU will be a place without borders with free circulation of people, goods and 
activities;( 4 )Greece with its political stance in Helsinki summit carry to the part of the Europe the 
responsibly of democratic transformation of Turkey and the compliance of this country with the orders of 
intemationallaw. Until then, Greece with the continual veto appeared as the clear European impediment of 
Turkey in its European orientation. However, the entrance of Turkey in EU will need a lot of time. 
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and will continue to offer to its neighbor technical knowledge in order to help Turkey to 
its difficult negotiations with the EU.175 
Turkey must understand that it has now a unique historical chance to obtain 
European identity and to facilitate not only the solution of the problems with its neighbors 
but also the solution of its serious internal problems that have guided this country to its 
present instability.176 An indication, or better, a drastic action of good will by Turkey will 
greatly facilitate this orientation, since the thesis pointed out that the obstructionism of 
this party constitutes the most important obstacle to the reintegration of Cyprus. The 
Cyprus issue is the key-problem that will contribute in the further improvement of the 
relations between Greece and Turkey. Coercive diplomacy by the USA can also help this 
effort, in a new dynamic effort of the two motherlands and a third-party mediation effort 
to connect the two Cypriot communities to establish a functional state that will satisfy the 
interests of all the Cypriots.177 178 As Crawshaw observes, it is not surprising that the 
175Platias. A., "The Next Motion," Ta Nea, 21 April2000. 
176 Following this policy's direction, the former Chief of Turkish Navy, Admiral Arkagia, 
introduced a memorandum to the Turkish government on May of 2000. He proposes some measures that 
will improve drastically the Greek-Turkish relations: the abrogation of 'Aegean's Army Corps', a creative 
Greek- Turkish dialogue for the solution of the bilateral issues, and abolition of 'casus belli' reasons of 
war. The Admiral supposes all these successive motives as mandatory requirements for the fmal acceptance 
ofhis country in EU. Thus, all the problems with Turkey's neighbors could anticipate with success by 2004. 
Kourkoulas, A., " The Wings of the Proposal for the Aegean's Army Corps," To Bhma, 28 May 2000. 
Kinzer also in an article notes in three different occasions a new climate in the Turkish political scene. First, 
a Turkish prosecutor's announcement that he wanted to indict General Kenan Evren, as a consequence of 
the military coup that the General had led. The same coup also consist central topic of the two other 
occasions: the films "After the Wall" and "Where The Rose Wilted." Thus, the journalist points out a new 
tension, along with other painful episodes in modem Turkish history. They can be discussed more openly 
than ever before. He carries out also the belief of political leader Mr. Yilmaz that "a part of it comes from 
our moving closer to the EU." Kinzer, S., "Turkey Reviews the Darkest Hours in Its Painful Past," New 
York Times, 28 May 2000. 
177 Ministers ofForeign Affairs ofthe USA, Greece and Turkey during a meeting in Washington 
on 3 of May 2000 supported: (1) Greece and Turkey must continue the effort of building good relations; (2) 
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Greek Cypriots should be reluctant to exchange the monopoly of sovereignty, with its 
huge advantages, for a constitution that involves sharing power with the Turkish 
Cypriots. Hope for the future must, therefore, rest with the men of moderation on both 
sides who recognize that reunification is in the best interests of all the Cypriot people; 
that sanctions and recriminations can only intensify the conflict.I79 
The Cyprus issue also emphasizes that third-party intervention may not be enough 
to resolve a conflict unless regional actors and interests are included in the peace process. 
The failure to reach a lasting political settlement to the Cyprus crisis declares the 
importance of achieving unified political support for negotiations at both the regional and 
International levels.I80 At the same time, the fact that the two Cypriot communities are 
not at war points out, from one side, the important role of UNFICYP on the island and 
The Cyprus problem consists a priority issue not only for Greece but also for Washington. Turkey must 
present a new approaching policy for this matter; (3) Greece and Turkey desire to improve new initiatives in 
the Balkans. Correspondence from New York, "Cyprus problem: Mr. Gem Search Out for a New 
Approximation ofthe Cyprus Problem,"kathimerini, 4 May 2000. 
178 Thesis' proposal for solution of Cyprus problem satisfies a main U.S' national interest: " Basic 
assurance of international security through maintenance of a relatively stable global and regional order in 
which states resolve their differences without the use of force, most nations enjoy political stability, and an 
increasing number of nations either have adopted stable democratic institutions or are engaged in 
meaningful institutions or are engaged in meaningful movement for that direction." Binnendijk, H., and 
Clawson, P., "New Strategic priorities," Washington Quarterly, pp109-126, spring 1995. 
179 Crawshaw, N.,"Cyprus; A Failure in Western Diplomacy," The World Today, pp.73-78, 
February 1984. In this direction a committee of Greek Cypriot jurists from all the political parties works for 
a plan about a new Constitution and new ideas about the solution of Cyprus problem. Then the National 
Security Council will talk and approve it. The final plan will consist the official answer of the Cyprus 
official government to the new mediation effort that aims to the change of the system of governance of the 
island. The new mediation effort proposes the establishment of a President of Republic without a lot of 
power in his hand, and will be alternate Greek and Turkish Cypriot. However the Greek- Cypriot side does not 
accept the proposal of Switcher land Cantons for three reasons: the alternative presidency with the present form, the 
sovereignty of cantons and the equal representation of cantons. Konstantinides, F., " Nicosia looks the alternative 
presidency," Eleutherotypia, 21 Jan.2000. 
180 Platias notes: "From the Thucydides' era is known that the success of the deep intentions of a state must 
match with the geopolitical conditions that exist in the international balance of power ... .In return, every 
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from the other side the failure of the UN mediation effort to a broader political settlement. 
It is also clear that a absence of the UN presence on the island, due to the fact that the 
donor countries have become weary of contributing troops to an operation that has no 
end, would provoke new political tensions and new fighting to resume. 
The proposal of this thesis cannot necessarily resolve the problem. The main 
effort was to emphasize that any kind of healthy solution must lower the fears, increase 
the incentives, and enhance the chances for a conductive interaction. There is a need for a 
new initiative, for a cooperative process in successive phases that would allow learning, 
flexibility, interaction and reciprocity. Demonstrations of respect, power sharing, 
monitoring elections to produce interdependence of groups, and the establishment of 
regional autonomy and federalism are important confidence-building measures that, by 
promoting the rights and positions of two Cypriot communities, mitigate the security 
dilemmas that produce violence.I8l The proposal is a reintegration option through 
political-economic power sharing that would form the basis for a long-term process of 
state building, rather than an unworkable state. It is primarily through the effective use of 
federal and local government distribution policies and an investment programme to 
alleviate intercommunal inequalities by fostering a "mature rivalry environment," which 
means a creative cross-communal competition. It would foster mostly in a liberal-
strategy that does not match with the international environment is condemned to fail." Platias, A., 
"Convergence oflnterests," Ta Nea, 10 March 2000. 
181 Lake, A.D., and Rothchild, D., " Containing Fear," Theories of War and Peace, edited by 
Brown, E. M., Cote, R. 0., Lynnes-Jones, M. S., and Miller, S., pp.292-295, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England, 1998. 
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democratic regime necessary to provide both communities with a sense of political and 
economic security regarding each other. 
The domestic transformation in Cyprus would become a model of similar cases of 
ethnic conflict and external aggression. However, it is always the danger of exacerbating 
the conflict, especially if the necessary social-psychological preparation and institutional 
infrastructure are not ripe. This was the reason why the thesis pointed out the value of a 
healthy and well-organized pre-negotiation stage, as an attempt to emphasize the danger 
of a premature implementation, even one including extensive power-sharing provisions-
that is, imposed on warring factions, it can exacerbate political relations. Additionally, the 
international mediation attempts until now had focused mostly on to stabilizing and not 
on an effective conflict management and a durable political settlement. The successive 
mediators failed to coordinate the interests at the regional and international level in order 
to develop a unified intervention strategy. This failure is due more to a lack of ripeness 
than to what mediators have or have not done .. The potential for the end of the impasse 
should be related to mutual utility calculations. The EU is a solution-challenge, which 
will allow the two Cypriot communities to reunite their island into a functional state, and 
to solve their security dilemmas. Cyprus must be a productive part of the European 







Cyprus at the beginning of 2000. 
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Cyprus- "UN Non-Map, 1992": B. Ghalr "Set of Ideas" and Common Commercial Zone. 
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